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Constitutional Law: Congressional Preemption Held to
Prevent State from Enforcing Stricter Pollution Standards
Against Nuclear Electrical Power Plant
The Atomic Energy Comnussion (AEC) issued Northern
States Power Company (NSP), plaintiff, a permit authorizing
NSP to proceed with construction of a nuclear electrical power
generating plant near Monticello, Minnesota.' The regulations
under which that permit was issued, and under which an operat-
ing license was later issued,2 set standards limiting the amounts
of radioactive materials which plaintiff was permitted to release
into the air and water as a byproduct of plant operation.3 Pur-
suant to a Minnesota statute4 the Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency (PCA) issued plaintiff a permit to discharge cooling
water and liquid waste into the Mississippi River but conditioned
the permit on compliance with radioactive waste discharge stan-
dards more restrictive than those of the AEC. NSP brought a
declaratory judgment action alleging that Minnesota was without
authority to regulate the discharge of radioactive wastes because
this field of regulation had been preempted by the federal gov-
ernment. Defendants, the State of Minnesota and the Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency, demed that Minnesota was without
such authority and asserted that Minnesota has the right under
the tenth amendment 5 to protect the health of its citizens and to
regulate and prevent pollution within its borders. The United
States District Court, District of Minnesota, held that Congress
has preempted the disputed field of regulation and that the State
of Minnesota is without authority to regulate the release of radi-
oactive materials from plaintiff's Monticello nuclear power plant.
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 320 F Supp. 172
(D. Minn. 1970).
The court based its decision upon a finding of express con-
gressional intent to preempt the field of regulation of radioactive
releases by nuclear power plants.6 The PCA argued that the
1. 2 CCH AToMIc ENERGY L. Rn'. f 11,264 (1967).
2. Jan. 19, 1971. At the time of the decsaon the operating license
for the plant had not been issued (Stipulation nos. 17, 24, 44).
3. See 10 C.F.R. pt. 20 (1970).
4. MINN. STAT. § 115.03 (1969).
5. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
6. 320 F. Supp. at 175.
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regulation of radioactive waste releases into the environment fell
squarely witlun the traditional concept of the state police power7
and that Minnesota had the right under the tenth amendment to
protect the health of its citizens and to regulate and prevent pol-
lution within its borders.8 The court applied the rule announced
in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.0 which requires that before a
state regulation falling within the exercise of the historic police
powers of the states will be preempted by an act of Congress, the
court must find a clear and manifest expression of congressional
intent or design to preempt the field of regulation at issue. The
court in the instant case found such a clear and manifest assertion
of congressional intent to preempt in the 1959 Amendment 0 to
the Atomic Energy Act of 195411 and in the committee reports ac-
companying the passage of the 1959 Amendment.12
On the assumption that doubt existed as to the express in-
tent of Congress, the court also found implied congressional in-
tent to preempt the field of regulation. Without elaboration the
court cited the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme;
Congress' mandate, and not mere authorization, to the AEC to
regulate; the fact that diverse state laws would frustrate the con-
gressional purpose to achieve uniformity, and concluded, on these
bases, that the state regulation was an obstacle to the accomp-
lishment of the full purposes of Congress in enacting the Atomic
Energy Act and, therefore, that Congress intended to preempt
the field.13
Preemption is a doctrine of statutory construction. The
power of Congress to preempt a field of regulation is derived
from the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution."4
A court must first find that Congress has acted pursuant to a
power delegated to Congress by the Constitution.'5 If the act is
7. Id. at 177.
8. Id.
9. 331 U.S. 218 (1947)
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1964).
11. 68 Stat. 921-61 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-296 (1964)
12. S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1959)
13. 320 F. Supp. at 178.
14. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. "This Constitution, and the laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof shall be
the supreme Law of the Land "
15. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-296 (1964)
was enacted by Congress pursuant to its powers to regulate interstate
commerce (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3), to provide for the common de-
fense and security (U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-14) and with respect to
United States property and territory (U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 4)
There is little doubt that these powers provide a sufficient basis for the
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constitutional, then the basic inquiry of the court is directed to-
wards a finding of express or implied congressional intent to pre-
empt the disputed field of regulation. To this end the Supreme
Court has employed various tests.
Where the state regulation "conflicts" with a federal regula-
tion, the state regulation will be preempted. Conflict may be of
two kinds. The first requires preemption "where compliance
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibil-
ity for one engaged in interstate commerce."' 0 The second and
more usual kind of conflict arises only in certain factual circum-
stances, "where Congress has chosen to 'circumscribe its regula-
tion and occupy only a limited field,' while State regulation is
'outside that limited field,' and yet an inference of negation of
State action is sought to be drawn."17
The basic test of preemption, which is applied in nearly all
cases, is found in Hines v. Davzdowitz.18 Preemption will be
found where the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomp-
lishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."'19 The Supreme Court in Florta Ltme and Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Pau2 0 restated the test as "whether both reg-
ulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superin-
tendence of the field,"21 with the primary principle being that
"federal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed
preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persua-
sive reasons-either that the nature of the regulated subject mat-
ter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has un-
mistakably so ordained. 22
The likelihood that the Court will find the state regulation an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the objectives of Congress de-
pends upon the subject matter of the disputed field of regulation.
The Court will infer a congressional intent to preempt where the
regulatory scheme enacted by Congress. See Estep & Adelman,
State Control of Radiation: An Inter-Governmental Relations Problem,
60 tICn. L. REv. 41, 44-50 (1961).
16. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142-43 (1963).
17. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 740 (1941) (dissenting opimon
citing Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 10 (1937)), see also Huron Port-
land Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960), and Florida Lime and
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
18. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
19. Id. at 67.
20. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).




subject matter by its nature demands exclusive federal regula-
tion m order to achieve uniformity vital to national interests.2
The Court readily finds preemption in cases under the commerce
clause on the basis of the need for umformity of regulation.24 In
the field of interstate commerce, however, where there has been
a compelling state interest in public order and safety, the Court
has sustained the state regulation in the absence of a clearly ex-
pressed congressional intent to the contrary 25
The Court has also inferred a congressional intent to pre-
empt where Congress has authorized a pervasive regulatory
scheme.26 But the usefulness of this test has been left in doubt
by the decision in Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul,27 where the majority opinion dismissed the issue while
the four dissenting justices vigorously argued the existence of "a
comprehensive and pervasive regulatory scheme. ' '2 8  This may,
however, show no more than the Court's willingness to pick and
choose among alternative characterizations.
A court may find that Congress, more or less expressly, in-
tended that the federal regulation preempt the field without
finding conflict, a need for uniformity or pervasiveness of fed-
eral regulation. The Supreme Court has in various ways stated
the test for finding an express congressional intent to preempt.
The general statement of the test is that preemption requires an
"explicit declaration of congressional design to displace state reg-
ulation. '29 Where a state has exercised its traditional and his-
toric police powers, however, the rule is that such "historic police
powers of the States [are] not to be superseded unless that
[is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress,"3 0 or that there
23. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)
24. See San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236 (1959), Southern Pac. Ry v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), Pennsyl-
vania R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566 (1919)
25. See International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Ag-
ricultural Implement Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (tort recov-
ery allowed to employee for malicious union conduct), Youngdahl v
Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (state allowed to enjoin violent conduct
by striking employees)
26. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941), Pennsylvania v.
Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502 (1956)
27. 373 U.S. 132 (1963)
28. Id. at 166.
29. Id. at 143.
30. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), see also
Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146 (1963)
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is "an unambiguous congressional mandate to that effect."31 The
language manifesting .express congressional intent may be found
in either the statutory -language or, if necessary, its legislative
history -3 2 Where Congress manifests its design expressly,
rather than inferentially, the Court will give effect to that design,
even though the state regulation .could otherwise stand beside
the federal regulation on the bases of the other tests, and even
where the state regulation falls within the traditional scope of
police powers.of.the states. 3
The finding of a -clear and manifest expression of congres-
sional intent to preempt the field of regulation of radioactive
waste releases -by nuclear power plants is derived from the 1959
Amendment 34 to the Atomic Energy Act of 195435 and from the
committee reports accompanying the 1959 Amendment." In par-
ticular, the court in, the instant case relied upon the purpose of
the 1959 Amendment which was:
to clarify the respective responsibilities of the States and
the Commission with respect to the regulation of byproduct,
source, and special nuclear materials
[and]
to promote an orderly regulatory pattern between the Comnus-
sion and State governments with respect to nuclear development
and use and regulation of byproduct, source, and special nuclear
materials.3 7
In Section 274(b) of the 1959 Amendment, now 42 U.S.C. §
2021(b) (1964), Congress provided that the AEC may enter into
"turnover" agreements with the states, ceding specific authority
to the states,3 8 but in Section 2021(c) Congress provided that "no
31. Florida Lime- and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
147 (1963).
32. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (legisla-
tive history), Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961) (statutory lan-
guage).
33. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 231-32 (1947),
where the Supreme Court illustrates a plausible argument whereby the
state and federal regulations could otherwise stand together.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1964).
35. 68 Stat. 921-61 -(1954), 42 U:S.C. §§ 2011-296 (1964).
36. S. RaP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (a) (1) & (3) (1964)
38. Under an agreement the AEC may give states authority over
(1) byproduct'material, (2) source material and (3) special nuclear ma-
terial m quantitites not -sufficient to, form a critical mass; but, under 42
U.S.C." § 2021(c) (1964), the AEC must retain regulatory power over (1)
the construction and operation.of any production or utilization facility,
(2) the export or import of byproduct, source and special nuclear materi-
als, (3) the disposal into the ocean of the same materials and(4) the dis-
posal of the same-materials which the AEC determines to be especially
hazardous. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(j) (1964)- authorizes the AEC to terminate
agreements if necessary to protect the public health and safety.
122719.71]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
agreement entered into pursuant to subsection (b) of this section
shall provide for discontinuance of any authority and the Com-
mission shall retain authority and responsibility with respect to
construction and operation of any production or utilization
facility" The committee report which accompanied the bill said:
(b) Licensing and regulation of more dangerous activities
-such as nuclear reactors-will remain the exclusive responsi-
bility of the Commission.
3. It is not intended to leave any room for the exercise of dual
or concurrent jurisdiction by States to control radiation hazards
by regulating byproduct, source or special nuclear materials.
5. The Joint Committee believes it important to emphasize
that the radiation standards adopted by States under the agree-
ments of this bill should either be identical or compatible with
those of the Federal Government. The committee recog-
nizes the importance of the testimony before it by numerous
witnesses of the dangers of conflicting, overlapping, and incon-
sistent standards in different jurisdictions, to the hinderance of
industry and jeopardy of public safety 39
In further support of its finding of express congressional in-
tent to preempt, the court in the instant case cited an AEC reg-
ulation asserting that the AEC shall have sole authority to regu-
late discharges 40 and relied upon decisions of the Supreme Court
permitting administrative interpretation in preemption cases to
be given great weight.41 The court also cited lower state court
decisions in California and New York which held that the AEC
had exclusive authority to regulate the disposal of radioactive
wastes.42 The court concluded with its summary finding of im-
plied congressional intent to preempt.
The court certainly was not unreasonable in finding a "clear
and manifest" assertion by Congress of its intent to preempt the
field of regulation at issue.43  The evidence, however, upon
which it relied as establishing a clear and manifest assertion of
39. S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (emphasis added)
40. 10 C.F.R. § 8.4 (1970)
41. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942), Mintz v
Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933)
42. 320 F. Supp. at 176.
43. The court is supported in its decision by a well-reasoned article,
upon which the court relies (Id. at 177), which concludes that "unless a
state executes an agreement with the AEC, the state is constitutionally
precluded from imposing general health and safety regulations upon
users of source, special nuclear and by-product materials." Estep &
Adelman, supra note 15, at 63. The authors base their conclusion on al-
most the same evidence of congressional intent as the court based its de-
cision. Id. at 58-63. See also Cavers, State Responsibility in the Regula-
tion of Atomic Reactors, 50 Ky. L.J. 29, 29-32 (1961), where the same con-
clusion is reached on the same evidence.
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congressional preemptive intent is not so conclusive so as to pre-
clude a contrary finding. First, Congress expressly rejected a
proposal to include in the 1959 Amendment a statement granting
the AEC sole authority over certain defined areas.44 Instead,
Congress adopted the language in 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) (1964) that
"the Commission shall retain authority and responsibility with
respect to the regulation of [enumerated subjects] " The
AEC endorsed the language Congress adopted. Mr. Lowenstein,
who represented the AEC, said in the committee hearings:
We thought that this act without saying m so many words did
make clear that there is preemption here, but we have tried to
avoid defining the precise extent of that preemption, feeling
that it is better to leave these kinds of detailed questions per-
haps up to the courts later to be resolved. 45
From this defendants in the instant case argued that Congress,
having foreseen a federal-state conflict, balked, and that the court
should not now find an "implied" intent where Congress de-
clined to declare its "express" intent to preempt.4
There is merit to defendants' basic contention. Since the
position of the AEC, which was reflected in the final legislative
enactment, was that the courts should be left to define the bound-
aries of preemption, the inference arises that some subjects of
regulation, possibly some within the scope of the Act, were not
preempted, just as some subjects of regulation were preempted.
Defendants argued that the Act was not intended to reach the
regulation of wastes,47 unless the definition of "wastes" is in-
cluded within the meaning of byproduct materials, which the
AEC has clear authority to regulate under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2111-12
(1964). Those sections imply that byproduct materials must be
capable of "use," and defendants asserted that wastes were not
capable of any use and were outside the scope of the Act. Reg-
ulation of waste discharge, by this view, would be susceptible to
PCA regulation.
The court completely failed to discuss these issues, except
with respect to the AEC regulation asserting that the AEC has
sole authority to regulate wastes. 48 Defendants' contention as to
"wastes," however, has little merit. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(e) (1964), the
44. Hearings on Federal-State Relations Before the Joint Comm.
on Atomic Energy, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 307-08 (1959) (hereinafter cited
as 1959 Hearings.)
45. Id. at 308.
46. Brief for Defendants at 67, Northern States Power Co. v. Minne-
sota, 320 F. Supp. 172 (D. Minn. 1970).
47. Id. at 71-73.
48. 10 C.F.R. § 8.4 (1970).
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definitional section of the Act, provides that "[t] he term 'bypro-
duct material' means any radioactive material (except special
nuclear material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to
the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing
special nuclear material." "Waste" would appear to fall natu-
rally within this defimtion and thus be subject to AEC regula-
tion under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2111-12(1964) Also, 42 U.S.C. § 2012(d)
(1964) provides that the "processing and utilization of source,
byproduct and special nuclear material must be regulated in the
national interest. " "Processing" is broader in meaning
than "use," and the processing of wastes would appear to be with-
in the scope of the Act and subject to AEC regulation. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals 49 and the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals5" have held that "waste" is within the statutory meaning
of "byproduct." Furthermore, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (c) (1) (1964) pro-
vides that the AEC "shall retain authority and responsibility
with respect to regulation of the construction and operation of any
production or utilization facility" The AEC felt that the reg-
ulation of wastes was directly related to construction and design
of nuclear reactors and that regulation could not be separated
from the regulatory control over construction and operation
which the AEC was expressly ordered to retain." The court in
the instant case did not refer to this persuasive AEC argument.
In attributing "great weight" to the AEC regulation assert-
ing that the AEC has sole authority to regulate wastes, absent an
agreement, the court placed undue reliance on the two Supreme
Court decisions it cites.5 2
In Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson,3 a case involving
the regulation of renovated butter, the Supreme Court found
the state law preempted because it was in conflict with the fed-
eral statute. The only language which might be interpreted to
support the Northern States Power Co. decision is where the
Court says: "The views of the Solicitors of Agriculture have
long been in accord with our conclusion. Opinion No. 2829, Oc-
tober 18, 1949."54 That statement is not directed toward the find-
ing of preemption in Cloverleaf, but rather to the opening sen-
tence in the paragraph in which the Court agrees with respond-
49. Harris County v. A.E.C., 292 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1961).
50. New Britain v. A.E.C., 308 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
51. 1959 Heartngs, supra note 44, at 306.
52. 320 F Supp. at 176.
53. 315 U.S. 148 (1942)
54. Id. at 164.
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ent that the federal government cannot confiscate or condemn
materials under the renovated butter act.55
In Mintz v. Baldwin, 6 the U.S. Department of Agriculture
regulated under the Cattle Contagious Diseases Act shipments of
cattle from quarantined districts established by the Secretary
while New York regulated shipments of cattle into New York
from non-quarantined districts. The shipment of cattle at issue
was not made from a quarantined district. The Act expressly
prohibited state regulation only where the federal government
had acted, "strongly [suggesting] that Congress intended not
otherwise to trammel the enforcement of state quarantine mea-
sures."57 The Department of Agriculture did not regulate the
particular disease involved, its policy being to leave control of the
disease to the states.58 The Court, in holding that the state reg-
Ulation was not preempted, said that "much weight" was to be
given to the Department of Agriculture's "acquiescence in the
enforcement of state measures."5 9 This case did not involve an
agency determination that state regulation was precluded. In
the instant case the court attributed "great weight" to the deter-
mination of the AEC without stating its basis for doing so. The
court did not cite any purpose of the Atomic Energy Act which
would be thwarted should the PCA have concurrent power to
regulate wastes.
The court's finding of an implied congressional intent to pre-
empt the field is especially weak, for it states the issues as con-
clusions without expressing any rationale therefor. The parties
vigorously argued the issues of the need for uniformity, of con-
flict, of pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme and of the
dominance of the federal interest. A persuasive argument has
been made that these factors would not compel preemption. 0
55. Id. at 163.
56. 289 U.S. 346 (1933).
57. Id. at 351.
58. Id. at 349.
59. Id. at 351.
60. Note, Federal Pre-emption and State Regulation of Radioactive
Atr Pollution: Who Is the Master of the Atomic Genie?, 68 MIeC. L. Rrv.
1294, 1306-14 (1970). The writer argues that although the states may
lack resources to regulate the whole field effectively, they might effec-
tively concentrate then resources on specific problem areas; that states
might be more effective regulators on balance, because the AEC may be
doing more promoting than regulating (a "captured agency"), that the
state interest in pollution abatement (defendants in the Northern States
Power Co. case argued that the only purpose of its regulaton was to
prevent pollution) as a local problem is paramount, and that the cost of
state regulation would not be unduly burdensome.
1971] 1231
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The court concludes, however, that these factors would establish
preemption."'
The decision does not entirely preclude state police power
regulation of atomic energy It operates only to prohibit the
states from setting radioactive discharge standards, an area
whose control the court felt Congress had preempted. The 1959
Amendment itself provides for "turnover" agreements which
would permit states to regulate specified areas so long as the
state regulations are compatible with the federal regulations. 2
This provision provides a broad framework for state regulation.
Minnesota has not entered into any such agreement. Nor are
states prohibited from regulating non-radiation hazards related
to the construction and operation of nuclear reactors.08 Haz-
ards which may be regulated by local building codes include
plumbing, electrical wiring and construction design and materi-
als. Such regulations, however, are permissible only to the ex-
tent that compliance with their terms does not engender conflict
with the supervening federal regulations.64  States also retain
their traditional power over land use control, which presumably
extends to the site selection for a federal licensed nuclear fa-
cility 05 Within the traditional police power the states have
power to regulate thermal pollution by nuclear power plants, as
the AEC has no power in this field of regulation. 0 Likewise,
states may exercise broad regulatory power with respect to state-
owned facilities, like highways and sewage systems, unless the
federal government asserts its power over these facilities through
use of the power of eminent domain. 7 Although Minnesota did
not do so here, 8 states have the opportunity to intervene in the
federal licensing procedure.69
Although the evidence upon which the court relies in mak-
ing its finding of express congressional intent to preempt may
61. 320 F Supp. at 178.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1964).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1964)
64. Preemption might be based on "conflict." See Estep & Adel-
man, supra note 15, at 60-61.
65. See id. at 61.
66. See New Hampshire v A.E.C., 406 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1969)
67. See Estep & Adelman, State Control of Radiation. An Inter-
Governmental Relations Problem, 60 MICH. L. REv. 41, 56-57 (1961)
68. Minnesota did make a limited appearance to offer evidence and
testimony and to advise the Commission as provided in 10 C.F.R. §
2.715 (1970) 2 CCH AToMIc ENERGY L. REP. 11,264 (1967)
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (i) (1964), 10 C.F.R. § 2.715 (1970) For exam-
ple, the location of the Monticello nuclear plant on the Mississippi River
upstream from the point where Minneapolis draws its water supply might
1232 [Vol. 55:1223
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not be preclusive, it is substantial and convincing, and it might
be expected that on appeal the decision would be affirmed on this
basis. Should the appellate court find that no express declara-
tion of congressional intent to preempt was made, it would have
to determine the existence of implied congressional intent to pre-
empt. Defendants would then have to show that the state interest
in regulation of atomic waste pollution overbalances the national
interest in uniformity of criteria and in promotion of nuclear
electric power. This would not be an impossible burden to sus-
tain, but it would be difficult, and the court, notwithstanding the
state interest, could sustain the existence of an implied congres-
sional intent to preempt.
have been changed. NSP was authorized to use the river water for cool-
3ng purposes and was also authorized to discharge radioactive wastes
into the river. This is a chief reason why the PCA attempted to en-
force more strict discharge standards than those imposed by the AEC.
1971] 1233
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Constitutional Law- Intentional Discriminatory En-
forcement of Criminal Statute Held to Violate the Fifth
Amendment
The United States prosecuted a private investigator for
the alleged wiretap interception and divulgence of private tele-
phone conversations, in violation of section 605 of the Commum-
cations Act of 1934.1 After the jury returned a verdict of guilty,
the defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal on the
ground that the government had engaged in a systematic and in-
tentional policy of discrimination in its enforcement of the stat-
ute, in violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
The trial court granted the motion and acquitted the defendant,
holding that the Government should not be allowed to prosecute
private individuals so long as its own agents are free to practice
unlawful wiretapping with impunity United States v. Robinson,
311 F Supp. 1063 (W.D Mo. 1969)
There is no explicit mention made in the Constitution of a
right to nondiscriminatory law enforcement. Nevertheless, in
1886 the Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins 2 held that the
discriminatory enforcement of a state law by state officials was
a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In Yick Wo, a San Francisco county ordinance made
unlawful the operation of a laundry without the consent of the
county board of supervisors, except in a brick or stone building.
The parties stipulated that 310 laundries were operating in build-
ings made of wood in San Francisco, over 200 of which were
owned by Chinese aliens. It was also admitted that "petitioner
and 200 of his countrymen similarly situated petitioned the board
of supervisors for permission to continue their business in the
various houses which they had been occupying and using for
laundries for more than twenty years, and such petitions were
denied, and all the petitions of those who were not Chinese, with
one exception were granted."3  In holding that Yick Wo's
conviction for carrying on an unlawful business was a denial of
equal protection, the Court reasoned:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in ap-
pearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public au-
1. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964) reads in part: "[N]o person not being au-
thorized by the sender shall intercept any comnmunication and divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning of
such intercepted communication to any person."
2. 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
3. Id. at 359.
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thority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically
to make unjust and illegal discrimnations between persons in
similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.r4
The Court in Yick Wo established a basic corollary to the
equal protection principle embodied in the fourteenth amend-
ment which has since been included, by a process of reverse in-
corporation, in the fifth amendment's due process clause.5 The
rationale of this corollary is that a government which is prohibited
from enacting statutes which unjustly discriminate against citi-
zens of a certain class should not be able to accomplish the same
result by enforcing otherwise valid laws in a discriminatory
fashion.
The courts are split, however, as to whether the equal pro-
tection prohibition against discriminatory enforcement should be
applied to cases in which a cnmnal statute was discriminatorily
enforced. 6 Yick Wo's criminal prosecution for operation of an
4. Id. at 373-74.
5. Though the fifth amendment contains no equal protection
clause such a requirement would now probably be read into the due
process clause. Since the Supreme Court cautiously announced in Boll-
ing v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954), that "discrimination may be so un-
justifiable as to be violative of due process," the courts have invariably
held that state discrimination which offends the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause is equally offensive to the fifth amendment when
conducted by federal officials. See, e.g., Nielson v. Secretary of Treasury,
424 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1970), m which the court announced: "The courts
stand ready to invoke the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as to actions by states, or the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment which provides equivalent safeguards against unreason-
able action by the Federal Government." Id. at 846.
6. In support of the proposition that no constitutional guarantee of
equal enforcement attaches in the area of criminal law see People v.
Darcy, 59 Cal. App. 2d 342, 139 P.2d 118 (1943) (perjury in election regis-
tration affidavit), People v. Montgomery, 47 Cal. App. 2d 1, 117 P.2d
437 (1941) (conspiracy to commit pandering), Jackie Cab Co. v. Chicago
Park Dist., 366 fll 474, 9 N.E.2d 213 (1949) (taxi cab regulation statute),
Society of Good Neighbors v. Mayor of Detroit, 324 Mich. 22, 36 N.W.2d
308 (1949) (lottery law), Bailleaux v. Gladden, 230 Ore. 606, 370 P.2d
722, cert. dented, 371 U.S. 848 (1962) (habitual criminal statute).
For decisions holding that the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment forbids intentional discrimnation in the enforcement
of penal statutes see Moss v. Hornig, 314 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1963) (Sunday
closing law), Glicker v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm'n, 160 F.2d 96
(6th Cir. 1947) (action by liquor control commission), People v. Harris,
182 Cal. App. 2d 837, 5 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1960) (state and municipal gam-
bling law), Wade v. City and County of San Francisco, 82 Cal. App. 2d
337, 186 P.2d 181 (1947) (anti-magazine solicitation ordinance), People v.
Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128, (1962) (Sun-
day closing law), People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901, 200 N.E. 2d 779,
252 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1964) (multiple dwelling statute)
For excellent discussions of this subject see Note, Discrnmmiatory
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unlawful business was the result of the discriminatory adminis-
tration of a regulatory ordinance respecting laundry permits.7
Presumably, the criminal sanctions were uniformly invoked
against anyone who violated the laundry ordinance. Many courts
have concluded that this should distinguish Yick Wo from those
cases in which it is the criminal statute itself which is discrimina-
torily enforced. In People v. Montgomery,8 for example, the
court refused to apply the Yick Wo doctrine to a case involving
the discriminatory enforcement of a pandering statute. Such ap-
plication, the court reasoned, would undermine effective admin-
istration of the state police power 9 and "protect a criminal in the
commission of his crme."' 0 The court found an obvious distinc-
tion between extending protection to persons engaged in the
"harmless and somewhat necessary business of laundering," and
the extension of a like protection to those engaged in "vicious
social evil."" Similarly, in Society of Good Neighbors v. Mayor
of Detroit,'2 the court argued that the ordinance in Yick Wo was
intended to be administered according to the discretion of the city
officials, who then abused that discretion, whereas criminal stat-
utes represent an absolute mandate, from which courts must re-
frain from interfering. 3
Law Enforcement and Equal Protection From the Law, 59 YALE L.J. 354
(1950) and Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of
State Penal Laws, 61 COLUm. L. REv. 1103 (1961)
7. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
8. 47 Cal. App. 2d 1, 117 P.2d 437 (1941).
9. Such a contention is specifically rejected in Glicker v. Michigan
Liquor Control Comm'n, 160 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1947)
The ruling of the District Court can not be sustained on the
principle that the regulation of the liquor traffic by the State is
in the exercise of its police power and therefore not subject to
the constitutional restrictions referred to, although there are
state decisions to that effect. It is well settled under the deci-
sions of the U.S. Supreme Court that a state police regulation
is, like any other law, subject to the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 100.
10. 47 Cal. App. 2d at 14, 117 P.2d at 446.
11. Id. Present here is the familiar distinction between malum in
se and malum prohibitum. Accordingly, a distinction is made between
activity not intrinsically dangerous (i.e., laundering) and activity which is
inherently criminal and deleterious to society (i.e., pandering, gambling,
perjury, etc.) "[T] he needs of society demand that persons perpetrating
intrinsically harmful acts be punished whenever apprehended, even if
the punishment is the product of unequal enforcement, while the needs
of society do not require that acts not harmful in themselves be punished
if discriminatory enforcement is involved." Comment, supra note 6, at
1103, 1107. See also Saunders v. Lowry, 58 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1932), Peo-
ple v. Darcy, 59 Cal. App. 2d 342, 139 P.2d 118 (1943)
12. 324 Mich. 22, 36 N.W.2d 308 (1949).
13. Id. at 27, 36 N.W.2d at 310. This view loses credence when it
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Sustaining this position is a belief held by many courts14
that application of the Yick Wo doctrine to criminal prosecutions
might result in the effective nullification of many statutes and
the wholesale freeing of criminals:
It would be unconscionable, for instance, to excuse a defendant
guilty of murder because others have murdered with impunity.
The remedy for unequal enforcement of the law in such in-
stances does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the ex-
pense of society.' 5
A similar view was expressed in People v. Darcy,'0 where the
court held that to allow an accused perjurer to defend on grounds
of discriminatory enforcement "could easily lead to a rule that
if some guilty persons escape, others who are apprehended should
not be prosecuted."' 7
A number of courts have reached the opposite result, finding
the equal protection guarantee against intentionally discrunina-
tory enforcement of the law applicable to the enforcement of
penal statutes.'8 Although the language of these opinions is of-
ten quite broad, the cases fequently involve minor crimes lacking
any significant moral dimension.'9 For example, in People v.
Utica Daw's Drug Co., 20 the charge against a defendant accused
of violating a Sunday closing law was dismissed on grounds of
is considered that (1) the issue would never have arisen without some
exercise of discretion on the part of law enforcement officials, and (2)
in practical fact, the American penal system contemplates the exercise
of discretion on the part of law enforcement officials in determining
whom to prosecute. 42 Am. JuR. Prosecuting Attorneys § 14 (1942)
14. See People v. Darcy, 59 Cal. App. 2d 342, 353, 139 P.2d 118, 125
(1943), People v. Montgomery, 47 Cal. App. 2d 1, 14, 117 P.2d 437, 446(1941), Society of Good Neighbors v. Mayor of Detroit, 324 Mich. 22, 27,
36 N.W.2d 308, 310 (1949).
15. People v. Montgomery, 47 Cal. App. 2d 1, 14, 117 P.2d 437, 446
(1941). Such a proposition may fail to recognize that without the exist-
ence of the acquittal remedy, society would lack its most effective way
of raising the issue of the propriety of discriminatory enforcement.
16. 59 Cal. App. 2d 342, 139 P.2d 118 (1943).
17. Id. at 353, 139 P.2d at 125. This fear is well rebutted in the
Darcy dissent:
It is, of course, the law that a person committing a crime
cannot claim an unlawful discrimination upon a mere showing
that other persons or classes of persons have committed the
same offense and have not been prosecuted therefor. But
where that fact is shown plus an arbitrary, intentional and de-
liberate discriminatory intent on the part of the law enforce-
ment officers, a different problem is presented. In such case,
an accused has made out a case of denial of equal protection.
Id. at 358-59, 139 P.2d at 128.
18. See note 6 supra.
19. Id. For a more complete listing see Comment, supra note 6, at
1106-07 n. 12.
20. 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1962).
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unconstitutionally discriminatory enforcement. The court noted
that "the burden [of proof] resting upon the defendant is a heavy
one."21 Showing "mere laxity" of enforcement is insufficient; 22
the defendant must demonstrate the existence of intentional se-
lectivity of enforcement which is not based upon a "rational pat-
tern. ' 23  When "the selective enforcement is designed to dis-
criminate against the persons prosecuted, without any intention
to follow it up by general enforcement against others, ' 24 a vio-
lation of equal protection will be found.
Some judges fear that discriminatory enforcement may be
used as a technique of harassment or persecution. In People
v. Darcy,25 the defendant, an avowed communist, was convicted
of perjury on grounds that he had sworn to a false name in his
voter registration affidavit. His conviction was affirmed on ap-
peal, although the evidence showed that there were thousands of
affidavits containing similar false statements, none of which had
ever led to criminal prosecution since the usual remedy was a
postcard informing the affiant to come in to correct the error.
Four judges dissented, saying:
The basic principle of our system of government is that all
people, including the weak, the outnumbered and the noncon-
formist, stand before the courts on a basis of equality with all
other litigants. If the criminal processes can be deliberately and
intentionally abused to prosecute a particular individual because
he is a Communist, not because of what he has done, but because
of his beliefs, the fundamental cause for which we are now fight-
ing a great war becomes a hollow mockery 26
Courts and commentators urging application of the Yick Wo
doctrine in criminal cases emphasize that purposeful discrimi-
nation against the defendant as an individual or representative of
21. Id. at 20-21, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
22. Mere "laxity" of enforcement, though it may result in the un-
equal application of the law, is never considered sufficient to shield a
defendant from prosecution. Wade v. City and County of San Francisco,
82 Cal. App. 2d 337, 339, 186 P.2d 181, 182 (1947), People v. Utica Daw's
Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 15, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128, 131 (1962)
23. [E]ven if the enforcement of a particular law is selective,
it does not necessarily follow that it is unconstitutionally dis-
criminatory Selective enforcement may be justified when the
meaning or constitutionality of the law is in doubt and a test
case is needed to clarify the law or to establish its validity
Selective enforcement may also be justified when a striking
example or a few examples are sought in order to deter other
violators, as part of a bona fide rational pattern of general en-
forcement, in the expectation that general compliance will fol-
low and that further prosecutions will be unnecessary
16 App. Div. 2d at 21, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
24. Id.
25. 59 Cal. App. 2d 342, 139 P.2d 118 (1943)
26. Id. at 359, 139 P.2d at 129 (dissenting opinion)
1238 [Vol. 55:1234
CASE COMMENTS
a particular class is directly contrary to significant public in-
terests. Such action directly-undermines the purpose of the leg-
islature, since the law, vitiated to the extent of its nonenforce-
ment, ceases to exert any significant influence on the pattern of
community behavior.27  Nor can it be justified because of m-
sufficiency of police resources; such shortages would justify
only a careful allocation, based upon some rational pattern of se-
lectivity2s Furthermore, the fear that application of the Yick
Wo doctrine to criminal prosecutions might unduly hamper state
police efforts is considered unrealistic. As the Utica Daw's Drug
case indicates, the burden resting upon the defendant is a heavy
one, and even if he succeeds in sustaining it, he will not be im-
mune from a new prosecution in the event public authorities
undertake a-generalized enforcement of the law 20
It was against this background that United States v. Robinson
was decided. Robinson holds that the intentionally discrimina-
tory enforcement by Government officials of a federal crmmnal
statute violates the fifth amendment. To support its finding of
discriminatory enforcement, the court found that (1) Government
law enforcement agents were engaged in extensive wiretapping,
(2) such wiretapping violated section 605 and (3) although these
facts were known, the Department of Justice had systematically
refused to prosecute. With these findings, and citing Yick Wo as
primary authority, the court acquitted the defendant on grounds
of unconstitutionally discriminatory enforcement. There was no
discussion of whether the criminal nature of defendant's activity
should have distinguished the case from the basic model estab-
lished m Yick Wo.
Little argument can be had with the court's finding of Gov-
ernment wiretapping. The evidence that, at least prior to 1968,30
the FBI engaged in substantial wiretapping activity in violation
of section 605 is now irrefutable. 31 In addition to the cases cited
by the court,32 two recent studies give thorough documentation
27. See Note, supra note 6, at 354 n.4.
28. Id. at 357.
29. People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 20-21, 225
N.Y.S.2d 128, 136 (1962); 4 A.L.R. 3d 393, 402. This statement, of
course, is true only if the statute of limitations has not yet run.
30. On June 16, 1967, the Office of the Attorney General issued a
directive prohibiting wiretapping by federal agents. F. REMINGTON,
CPnVnAL JUSTICE ADMIsTRA7TON 108-09 (1969).
31. See notes 34 & 35 znfra.
32. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). These cases all involve
the admssability -of evidence acquired by federal wiretapping.
1971] 1239
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
to the court's conclusion that both federal and state authorities
were engaging in extensive wiretapping.33 These reports show a
pattern of surveillance being earned on with total immunity
from the threat of prosecution.34
The Robinson court found such wiretapping to be an obvious
violation of the statute.3 5 In light of the statutory language, this
determination seems correct. Section 605 states that "no person"
-a term consistently interpreted to comprehend federal agents 0
-shall "intercept and divulge or publish" information se-
cured by a wiretap.3 7 The Department of Justice, in attempting
to justify its wiretapping activity, had traditionally taken the
position that the mtradepartmental use of intercepted material
did not constitute "divulgence" within the meaning of the stat-
ute.3 8 This argument, even if accepted, would probably not have
removed the FBI's efforts from the purview of section 605, be-
cause of the additional language m the statute prohibiting the
"use"3 9 of intercepted communications for anyone's benefit.40
33. E. LONG, THE INTRUDERs (1967), S. DASH, R. KNOWLTON & R.
SCHWARTZ, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959)
34. In 1968, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act setting out the mechanics by which the FBI may wiretap and
yet comply with statutory and constitutional safeguards. It seems likely
that this development, together with the decision in Robinson, will per-
suade federal agents to stay within legal limits in their wiretapping ac-
tivity If the Government decides it is unwilling or unable fully to com-
ply with the new legislation, it may choose to continue its policy of dis-
criminatory enforcement of section 605, or, in light of the Robinson ban,
may decide to prosecute no one. If this latter alternative is selected, it
would mark the effective dermse of section 605, pointing up the fact
that, as a long range solution to the problem of governmental wiretap-
ping, the Robinson holding is clearly unsatisfactory This is the clearest
weakness of the Robinson decision, and once again states the issue of
whether the remedy for discrinnatory enforcement lies "in the exonera-
tion of the guilty at the expense of society"
35. 311 F Supp. at 1064.
36. See Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957), Nardone v.
United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937)
37. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964)
38. [T]he only offense under the present law [section 605] is to
intercept any communication and divulge or publish the same.
Any person, with no risk of penalty, may tap telephone wires
and act upon what he hears or make any use of it that does
not involve divulging or publication.
Hearings on H.R. 2266 and H.R. 3099 Before Subcomm. No. I of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1941) (statement
by Attorney General Jackson).
39. "No person having received any intercepted commum-
cation shall use [the same] or any information therein contained
for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto."
47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964)
40. As one commentator points out: "Obviously, without either dl-
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Eiren so, the court rejected the Government's definition of "di-
vulgence" as "unsound," finding no basis for such an interpreta-
tion in the statute.41 Possibly unknown to the court, the Justice
Department had already reversed itself and taken a sinilar po-
sition. 42
The court also rejected the Government's further argument
that its wiretapping activity was required by the public inter-
est.43 The court apparently believed that such a contention was
somewhat beside the point in view of the unambiguous language
of the statute.
44
The crucial issue in Robnson was whether a finding of dis-
crninatory enforcement of the statute should necessarily have
interdicted prosecution of the defendant. An analysis of the
cases in which a defense of discrinnatory enforcement has
been raised suggests that application of the Yick Wo rule would
not seriously jeopardize valid law enforcement activity nor en-
danger significant elements of society As one commentator
points out:
The principal objection to recognizing the right [against dis-
crimnatory enforcement]-that society may suffer if crimnals
go free merely because others are not pumshed-seems ade-
quately answered by the experience reflected in the cases in
which the claim has been raised. Serious crimes are almost
never involved; more frequently discrimination is alleged in the
enforcement of a minor municipal ordinance. It would appear
that the pressure of social necessity effectively prevents dis-
crimination in enforcement against major offenses 45
If this is so, the danger of significant social injury may be sub-
vulging or using, wire tappmg would be just an idle pastime." Don-
nelly, Comments and Caveats on the Wiretapptng Controversy, 63 YALE
L.J. 799, 801 (1954). It is possible, of course, that "use" would be inter-
preted only to mean "for private use."
41. 311 F. Supp. at 1065.
42. On June 16, 1967, the Office of the Attorney General issued a
Memorandum wluch stated:
1. Section 605 prohibits the interception and divul-
gence or use of telephone communications and is applicable to
federal law enforcement agents.
2. Interception is prohibited whether or not the
information which may be acquired is intended to be used
in any way or to be subsequently divulged outside the agency
involved.
F. RvMuNGTO N, supra note 30, at 108-09.
43. 311 F. Supp. at 1065.
44. The court dismissed the Government's argument in one sen-
tence saying: "While the Government attempts to justify its wire tap-
ping operations in the paramount interests of public safety. , the
statute in question contains no such exceptions." 311 F. Supp. at 1065.
45. Comment, supra note 6, at 1140-41.
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stantially less than some courts have imagined. To raise the
chimera of the freed murderer 46 as an objection to recognizing
the right against discriminatory enforcement, therefore, may be
unrealistic.
On the other hand, when equality under law is upset by in-
tentionally discriminatory enforcement, some public injury seems
likely to result. The difficult issue is whether the Yick Wo doc-
trine was intended to protect against such injury In Yick Wo,
the discriminatory application of the ordinance against the de-
fendant was the result of racial prejudice against the Chinese.
In Robinson, enforcement of the statute was an attempt, albeit
discriminatory, to further partially the purposes of the statute.
Defendant was prosecuted only because he had violated the law,
and not because of any ill will felt toward him by public officials.
Whether this distinction is valid depends upon the scope of
Yick Wo. Implicit in the Robinson decision is the belief that
presence of an invidious motive for prosecution is not required
for a finding of discriminatory enforcement. The absence of a
proper justification for not fully enforcing the statute makes any
partial enforcement discriminatory Though this seems to ex-
pand Yick Wo, it is probably justified. It reflects a feeling that
in a democratic society, one man's bundle of legally approved ac-
tivities should be no smaller than another's, where their circum-
stances are the same.
Supporting this rationale may be the belief that courts must
have some effective method of censuring intentionally discrmi-
natory enforcement. Though seldom articulated by the courts,
the discriminatory enforcement doctrine as applied to the en-
forcement of criminal statutes may be shorthand for a rationale
much like that which justifies the exclusionary rule in cases
where evidence is seized in violation of the fourth amendment.4 7
On the particular facts of Robinson, this rationale may be es-
pecially appropriate. In Robinson, the Department of Justice
sought to prosecute the defendant for a practice engaged in by its
46. See note 15 supra.
47. As Mr. Justice Clark stated in Mapp v. Ohio:
There are those who say that under our constitutional ex-
clusionary doctrine "[t]he criminal is to go free because the
constable blundered." In some cases this will undoubtedly
be the result. But, as we said in Elkins, "there is another con-
sideration-the imperative of judicial integrity." The
criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him
free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its
failure to observe its own laws
367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
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own agents. Although charged with responsibility for full and
fair enforcement, it abused that power not only by enforcing the
statute discrimmatorily, but by seeking to shelter its own agents
from prosecution. Failure strongly to censure discriminatory en-
forcement in such circumstances would likely breed greater dis-
respect for the law. The need for such action is all the more im-
portant where, as in the case of wiretapping, alternative meth-
ods of ensuring nondiscriminatory enforcement would probably
be ineffective.48
In the final analysis, a court's acceptance of the defendant's
plea of discriminatory enforcement may be attributable not so
much to a perception of actual wrong to the defendant, as to a
feeling that the upholding of such arbitrary prosecution would be
a wrong against the court itself, and the system of laws for which
it stands. As one court recently stated:
The claim of discriminatory enforcement does not go to the
question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant The
wrong sought to be prevented is a wrong by the public authori-
ties [A]rbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of a
generally disregarded law is a power frequently in-
voked in countries ruled by a dictator but wholly out of har-
mony with the principle of equal justice under law prevailing in
democratic societies. 49
48. An action for mandamus would not be successful. United
States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965), Powell v. Katzenbach, 359
F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Other factors suggesting that any form of di-
rect prosecution of Government wiretappers would be ineffective in-
clude: (1) the widespread use of wiretapping at all levels of government,
both state and federal (see S. DASg, s-upra note 33), and (2) the inher-
ently secretive and self-concealing nature of wiretapping, making dis-
covery of violations difficult.
49. People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 17-18, 225
N.Y.S.2d 128, 133 (1962).
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Consumer Law- Revolving Charge Account Rates Held
to Violate State Usury Law
The State of Wisconsin brought suit in the Circuit Court
of Dane County' against the J. C. Penney Company seeking an
injunction against alleged violations of the state's usury statute2
and provisions of the Wisconsin Small Loan Act. 3 The trial
court found that the defendant's revolving charge account agree-
ment which assessed a one and one-half percent monthly charge
on the declining unpaid balance of the customer's account (a
total maximum charge of 18 percent per annum) to be an exac-
tion of a greater sum for the "forbearance"' of money than is al-
lowed by law, making the transaction usurious. The trial court
concluded, however, that standing to sue under the state's usury
statute extended only to those who personally contracted with
the defendant company and that the matter did not create any
1. State v J. C. Penney Co., No. 125-287 (Cir. Ct. Wis., Nov. 13,
1969)
2. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 138.05(1) (a) (Supp. 1970)
(1) Except as authorized by other statutes, no person shall,
directly or indirectly, contract for, take or receive in money,
goods or things in action, or in any other way, any greater sum
or any greater value, for the loan or forbearance of money,
goods or things in action, than:(a) At the rate of $12 upon $100 for one year computed
upon the declining principal balance of the loan or forbear-
ance.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 138.09(9) (a) (Supp. 1970) states:
No person except as authorized by statutes shall di-
rectly or indirectly charge, contract for or receive any interest
or consideration greater than allowed in § 138.05 upon
the loan, use or forbearance of money, goods or things in action,
or upon the loan, use or sale of credit. The foregoing prohibi-
tion shall apply to any person who by any device or pre-
tence of charging for his services or otherwise seeks to obtain a
greater compensation than is authorized by this section.
3. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 214.01(3) (1957) states:
"Small loan" means the loan, use or forbearance of money,
goods or things in action of the amount or value of three hun-
dred dollars or less, or the loan, use or sale of credit of the
amount or value of three hundred dollars or less.
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 214.20 (1957) states:
No person other than a licensee shall engage in the business of
making small loans and, directly or indirectly, charge, contract
for or receive a greater rate of interest or consideration upon
any such loan than he is permitted by law to charge, contract for
or receive without being licensed under this chapter.
4. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 773 (Rev 4th ed. 1968) says:
Within usury law, [forbearance] signified contractual obli-
gation of lender or creditor to refrain, during given period of
time, from requiring borrower or debtor to repay loan or debt
then due and payable.
5. State v. J. C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 130, 179 N.W.2d 641, 643
(1970)
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common nuisance requiring an injunction at the instance of the
state.
6
On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court similarly held the
one and one-half percent monthly charge on the declining un-
paid balance to constitute an excessive charge for a forbearance
within the Wisconsin usury statute and thereby illegal; however,
the court went further and held that the violation of the statute
constituted a public nuisance which could be enjoined at the in-
stance of the state. State v. J C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179
N.W.2d 641 (1970)
The prohibition against usury has been recognized for cen-
turies.7 The Old Testament prohibition against demanding in-
terest on a loan of money or food was a moral injunction against
growing rich by a brother's misfortune.8 The emergence, in elev-
enth and twelfth century Europe, of widespread commercial
transactions, however, shifted attention from protection of the
necessitous individual borrower to the economic requirements of
a competitive commercial market. While this resulted in some
modification of the restrictions of earlier centuries, it never
completely eliminated them.9 Usury laws following the Euro-
pean pattern were introduced into the United States with its first
colonists and, at present, exist in statutory form in all but one
state.'0
As a result of the conflict between the historical moral in-
6. Wis. STAT. AimN. § 280.02 (1957) states, "An action to enjoin a
public nisance may be commenced and prosecuted in the name of the
state . by the attorney-general upon his own information. " The
trial court in the J. C. Penney case found it unnecessary to consider the
application of Wis. STAT. ANN. § 138.09(9) (a), quoted at note 2 supra or
the provisions of the Small Loan Act, quoted at note 3 supra.
7. For a thorough recounting see generally S. HOMER, A HISTORY
OF INTEREST RATES (1963), B. NELSor, THE IDEA or UsuRY (1969).
8. Exodus 22:25 says, "If you lend money to one of your poor
neighbors among my people, you shall not act like an extortioner toward
him by demanding interest from him."
9. See Johnson, Interest and Usury, in THE REALrnIES OF MAxIMUM
CnrIaNGs ON INTERST AND FINANCING CHARGES 5 (The Conference on Per-
sonal Finance Law 1969).
10. Benfield, Money, Mortgages, and Migraine-The Usury Head-
ache, 19 CASE W RES. L. Rsv. 819, 824, 835 (1968) See also 1 CCH CON-
sumam Cmrr GuiDE 510 (1970). At present New Hampshire is the
only state which has not fixed a statutory usury rate on contractual
agreements. Previously, Massachusetts had no fixed rate but in August,
1970 the legislature passed MASS. LAws 1970 ch. 826, putting a ceiling of
20 percent per annum on interest unless a higher rate is permitted by
statute or the lender notifies the attorney general of his intention to
charge a higher rate and maintains records of his transactions. MASS.
ANN. LAws ct 271, § 49 (Supp. 1970).
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junction against usury and the need for a market place free from
its restrictions," various legislative and judicial exceptions to
the general usury laws have developed. Among the legislative
exceptions which allow for rates in excess of those provided for
by the general usury statutes are small loan acts, industrial loan
laws and credit union acts.1 2 In addition, legislatures have en-
acted exemptions from general usury statutes for loans to corpo-
rations, loans which are insured by the Federal Housing Admin-
istration, loans by savings and loan associations and occasion-
ally loans made by banks or for business purposes. 3 The major
judicial development has been the time price exception. This
was based on the notion that the prohibition against usury was
limited to (1) loans of money or personal property repayable in
kind and (2) forbearances to require payment on a loan or debt
then due.' 4 This effectively extricated sales of land and goods
on time from the jaws of the economically restrictive usury laws,
since the time price doctrine rested on the theory that, first, such
a transaction was merely a sale of goods and not a loan of money
and second, there was no forbearance because the debt was based
on a future price and not on an amount then due.' 5
The widespread growth of consumer credit transactions in
this country has served to promote the enactment of additional
legislative exceptions to the general usury laws while encourag-
ing the judicial paring of the time price exception. 10 The in-
creased demand for credit on all levels and by all types of bor-
rowers has put growing pressure on many lenders, who often
must deal with rigid statutory rates, to cease extending credit to
11. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 10.
12. See Benfield, supra note 10, at 835. See also 1 CCH CONSUMER
CREDIT GUIDE 520 (retail installment sales acts), 540 (small loan
laws), 560 (industrial loan laws) and 1 570 (installment loan laws.)
13. See Benfield, supra note 10, at 835.
14. For the time price exception in its early development see Beete
v Bidgood, 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1827)
15. The classic formulaton of the doctrine in the United States is
set out in Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115, 118-19 (1861)
But it is manifest that if A propose to sell to B a tract of land
for $10,000 in cash, or for $20,000 payable in ten annual install-
ments, and if B prefers to pay the larger sum to gain time,
the contract cannot be called usurious. A vendor may prefer$100 in hand to double the sum in expectancy, and a purchaser
may prefer the greater price with the longer credit. Such a
contract has none of the characteristics of usury; it is not for
the loan of money, or forbearance of a debt.
16. B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGisLAToN 15 (1965)
provides a detailed discussion of the effect of credit transactions on usury
legislation. See also id. at 83 for a discussion of the effects of credit
transactions on the time price doctrine.
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the high-risk borrower.17 As a result, a growing number of leg-
islatures have begun to realize the need for rate flexibility in the
area of consumer credit and have enacted special rate ceilings for
retail installment sales and consumer loans.1 8 At the same time,
a flourishing consumer society has forced most buyers of goods
into the position of the necessitous borrower,' 9 thus qualifying
one of the underlying assumptions of the time price doctrine, i.e.,
equality of bargaining power between lender and borrower. -0
In addition, courts have found that as a practical matter there is
very little distinction to be made between the consumer install-
ment loan and the consumer installment sales transaction, al-
though theoretically the one was thought to be a loan of money
and thus subject to general usury statutes while the other was
considered a sale of goods on time and thus within the time price
exception.2 1 The courts of two states have chosen to eliminate
the difference in treatment by placing credit sales within the
scope of the usury statute, essentially depriving the time price
doctrine of its effectiveness. 22  Thus changes in the nature of
credit transaction in our consumer society have forced courts and
legislatures to take a new look at usury statutes and the applica-
tion of the time price doctrine.
The modern revolving charge account presents a umque
form of consumer credit transaction.2 3 Under the typical revolv-
17. "Malcolm, The New Maximum Charges, in THE REAALITES O
Mn&UM CEILINGS ON INTREsT Am FnWANC CEAiaEs 23 (The Confer-
ence on Personal Finance Law 1969).
18. See B. CuRIRA, supra note 16, at 65. See also note 12 supra.
19. See Benfield, supra note 10, at 838.
20. Under the earlier assumption of equality of bargaining power,
it was felt that a purchaser was not, like the needy borrower, a victim of
the rapacious lender, since he could refrain from the purchase if he did
not choose to pay.the price asked by the seller. General Motors Accep-
tance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 78, 262 S.W 425, 428 (1924).
21. See B. CURRAN, supra note 16, at 83. Curran notes:
[T]he consumer installment sale arrangement in which a se-
curity interest in the goods sold is retained by the seller and
which is immediately thereafter transferred to a credit mstitu-
tion, such as a bank or sales finance company, is in many re-
spects very similar to the purchase money consumer installment
loan arrangement in which a security interest in goods pur-
chased is acquired by the lender.
22. See Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W.2d
802 (1957) and Lloyd v. Gutgsell, 175 Neb. 775, 124 N.W.2d 198 (1963)
which was overruled by NED. REV. STAT. § 45-338 (1968) which provides
generally for a time price differential on installment sales contracts not
to exceed nine dollars per one hundred dollars per year add-on on the
first thousand dollars.
23. For a brief history of the revolving charge account see NATIONAL
RETAIL MERCHAN'T AsSOcIATION, EcoNoMIc CHARACTRISTICS or DrAlRT-
mENT STORE CREDrr 7 (1969).
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ing charge account, the customer enters into a written agreement
with the merchant, which usually allows him to purchase mer-
chandise for which he may pay the cash price at any time within
30 days without incurring any additional charges. If, however, he
has not paid the full amount within 30 days, the store assesses a
monthly charge, usually between one and two percent on the un-
paid balance, and states a minimum amount which the customer
must pay before the next billing date, generally about ten per-
cent of the entire balance. Each additional sale is merged into
the unpaid balance of the account after expiration of the 30 day
grace period. Each time the customer makes a purchase and de-
cides to charge it, he is required to sign a sales slip, thus agreeing
that the terms of the original contract shall apply to this sale.
Revolving charge accounts differ from other credit transactions
in that they operate for an indefinite period of time, allow the
customer several consecutive purchases on one account, and pro-
vide a single monthly billing with a charge on the entire unpaid
balance.
Prior to the instant case, the only court to deal specifically
with the problem of the revolving charge account in relation to
usury was the Tennessee Supreme Court in Dennis v. Sears, Roe-
buck and Company.24 The court in the Dennis case was faced
with a Tennessee statute25 which specifically allowed a one and
one-half percent monthly charge on a revolving charge account
despite an apparent constitutional prohibition against fixing a
rate of interest of more than ten percent per annum. 20 Noting
that there was a strong presumption in favor of the constitution-
ality of the acts of the Tennessee legislature, the court declined to
hold the revolving charge account legislation unconstitutional."
While simply presuming that a revolving charge account trans-
action was like any other credit sale at common law and thus
within the time price exception, the court concluded that if any
changes were to be made in the application of the time price doc-
trine, for social or economic reasons, 7.e., widespread use of pres-
ent day credit sales differing from the nature of sales transac-
tions when the time price exception evolved or the unusually
necessitous condition of a majority of today's credit buyers, the
changes were questions of policy to be determined by the legis-
lature and not the court.28
24. - Tenn. -, 446 S.W.2d 260 (1969)
25. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-11-104 (1964)
26. TENN. CONST. art XI, § 7.
27. Denms v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., - Tenn. at -, 446 S.W.2d at
263.
28. Id. at -, 446 S.W.2d at 265.
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Unlike Tennessee, the Wisconsin usury law is statutory
rather than constitutional.2 9 Though solidly rooted in the tradi-
tional moral prohibition against usury, the statute has seen many
changes over its 120 year history as a result of varying political
and economic pressures at work within the state. During the
nineteenth century, for example, periods of economic growth
brought a clamor for easy credit and tended to force the legis-
lature to raise the rate ceiling. Econonc recession, on the other
hand, made it more difficult for people to pay off their existing
debts and public opinion forced the rates down again.3 0 In an
effort to alleviate some of the pressures of the usury statute itself
by allowing higher rates for certain types of loan transactions,
the Wisconsin Legislature has, within the last 50 years, enacted
several new regulatory statutes. These include the Credit Union
Act of 1923, s1 the Small Loan Act of 1933, -32 and the Motor Ve-
hicle Installment Sales Act of 1935, s3 which gives the time price
doctrine express statutory recognition in Wisconsin. In addi-
tion, the legislature has created exemptions from the usury laws
for loans to corporations and Federal Housing Administration
loans.3 4
The Wisconsin court in the J C. Penney case was faced with
determining whether the revolving charge account fell within
the state's usury statute prohibiting the taking of interest on the
loan or forbearance of money in excess of 12 percent per an-
num.3 5 It having been agreed by the parties that the transac-
29. Wis. STAT. ANw. § 138.05(1) (a) (Supp. 1970), quoted at note 2
supra.
30. Freidman, The Usury Laws of Wisconsn: A Study ti Legal
and Soctal History, 1963 Wis. L. Rsv. 515, 536.
31. Wis. STAT. ANNx. § 186.09(1) (Supp. 1970) says: "The credit union
may make loans to members for such purpose and upon such terms as
the credit committee approves, at rates of interest not to exceed one per-
cent per month on the unpaid balance."
32. Wis. STAT. ANw. § 214.19 (1957) provides:
No licensee shall, directly or indirectly, charge, contract for or
receive a greater rate of interest or consideration than is fixed
as a maximum by the department under authority of section
214.07, upon any small loan, but every licensee may loan any
sum of money not exceeding 300 dollars in amount and upon
any such loan may charge, contract for and receive a rate of
interest or consideration winch does not exceed the said fixed
maximum rate of charge.
33. Wis. STAT. Awn. § 218.01 (1957) provides for a time price differ-
ential between 7 percent and 12 percent per annum on retail installment
sales of motor vehicles depending on the age of the vehicle.
34. Wis. STAT. AN. § 138.05(5) (Supp. 1970) provides an exemption
for loans made to corporations and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 219.03 (1957) pro-
vides for exemptions for FHA loans.
35. For a general discussion of the case see Note, Usury and the Time
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tion was not an actual loan, the court then had to determine
whether the revolving charge account transaction was a "for-
bearance" within the meaning of the statute or whether it fit
within the tune price exception.
The court first reasoned that the transaction was, indeed,
a "forbearance" in that there was an agreement to refrain from
collecting an existing debt as set forth in the traditional defini-
tion of a forbearance. While the original agreement appeared
to make the amount due and payable at a future date, the court
noted that a debt did, in fact, arise at the time the purchase was
made, after which the actual forbearance occurred. 30 The court
argued further that if it were concluded that the Wisconsin Legis-
lature by adopting the New York usury statute in 1851 also
adopted all constructions by the New York courts of the word
"forbearance" to that date as well as all subsequent constructions,
then the word "forbearance" should be interpreted to apply to
sales of personal property 37
Prior to the adoption of the New York usury statute by the
Wisconsin Legislature, the New York court in Dry Dock Bank v.
American Life Ins. & Trust Co.38 had decided that where the
substance is usury, there need not be an actual loan of money,
since a loan of money will be presumed for so much of the pur-
chase money as is equivalent to the cash value of the commodity,
and the excess of price over the just value is a premium for the
forbearance of the debt. Later, in London v. Toney,39 the court
reiterated its position saying that the forbearance of money
need not be preceded by an actual loan. Finally, in Universal
Credit Co., Inc. v. Lowell40 involving the sale of an automobile
under a conditional sales contract, the court held that a "for-
bearance" within the meaning of the New York usury statute
did apply to sales of personal property on credit.
While acknowledging the historic validity of the time price
exception as set forth in Hogg v. Ruffner,41 the court emphasized
that the doctrine was limited by the "spirit and intent of the
law against usury ",42 The court reiterated several times that it
Price Exception-Revolving Charge Accounts-En3oznng Usury as a Pub-
lic Nuisance, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 296.
36. 48 Wis. 2d at 135, 179 N.W.2d at 646.
37. Id. at 138, 179 N.W.2d at 647.
38. 3 N.Y. 344, 358 (1850).
39. 263 N.Y. 439, 446, 189 N.E. 485, 488 (1934)
40. 166 Misc. 15, 2 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1938)
41. 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115 (1861) See note 15 supra.




would look behind the mere form of the transaction to its sub-
stance.43 The court then applied several indicia of a true time
price sale to the revolving charge account to determine whether
the real substance of the transaction was subject to the state's
usury statute. The court first noted the absence of the quotation
of two prices to the customer. The only price at which the goods
were actually offered was the cash price, the time price being
neithercalculated nor quoted. There was no opportunity pre-
sented to the customer to choose between a cash and a quoted
time price.44 In addition, the Wisconsin court pointed out that
the charges themselves were computed by applying certain sched-
ules of charges to the cash price. The use of such a formula, the
court stated, was merely another indication that a real time price
had not been quoted and that the addition to the cash price by
such a formula was merely a financing plan for the extension of
credit.45 The court noticed also that the sales tax was computed
on the cash price, the company thereby taking advantage of the
statutory tax exemption for interest or financing charges" be-
cause of the impossibility of determining a time price on which
to base a tax.47 Finally, the court observed that the transaction
did not fall within the classic time price doctrine because (1) it
covered more than one sale4" and (2) because there was an op-
tion of lowering the alleged time price even after the services
had begun to run. 49 The court noted that there have been no
cases which have held that a contract covering more than a single
sale is a true time price sale and that the classic formulation of
the doctrine as posed in Hogg v. Ruffner " did not include the op-
tion of lowering the time price. In addition, the charge was not
pernissible as merely a penalty since it was not, in fact, used to
compel payment. On the contrary, the revolving charge was de-
signed to encourage the customer to delay payment.5' Nor, con-
43. Compare the court's comment in Beete v. Bidgood, 108 Eng.
Rep. 792, 793 (K-B. 1827), where the court initiated the time price excep-
tion by upholding a contract for the sale of land which appeared to ex-
act a usurious rate of interest, saying that it is the court's duty to look,
not at the form of words, but at the substance of the transaction.
44. 48 Wis. 2d at 145, 179 N.W.2d at 653.
45. Id. at 147, 179 N.W.2d at 653.
46. Wis. STAT. Ar;N. § 77.54 (8) (Supp. 1970) provides an exemption
from the sales tax for charges for interest, financing or insurance where
such charges are separately set forth upon the invoice given by the seller
to the purchaser.
47. 48 Wis. 2d at 149, 179 N.W.2d at 654.
48. Id. at 145, 179 N.W.2d at 653.
49. Id. at 144, 179 N.W.2d at 651.
50. 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115 (1861).
51. 48 Wis. 2d at 149, 179 N.W.2d at 654.
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cluded the court, can it be contended that this was a mere
"service charge" since there had been no evidence introduced to
prove that the actual cost of the service bore any relation to the
charge.
52
A final prerequisite to finding an agreement usurious under
Wisconsin law was an intent to avoid the statute.51 On this point
the court upheld the trial court's finding, in light of all the facts,
that the agreement was usurious on its face. It was not felt to be
unreasonable for the trial court to hold that evidence that an
agreement is not, in fact, a time price sale may also be symto-
matic of an attempt to evade the usury laws.54
Unlike the trial court, which held in favor of the defendant
J. C. Penney on the grounds that the right to assert violation of
the state's usury statute was a right personal to those who con-
tracted with the defendant, 55 the supreme court on appeal
granted an injunction against the respondent as a public nuisance.
The court reasoned that although there was a specific remedy for
the borrower under the statute, the small amount in controversy
was prohibitive in consumer actions. Further, since the statute
was enacted for the benefit of the public generally, and there was
no criminal sanction which the state could seek to impose in the
public's behalf, the court would allow equity to relieve where the
law was inadequate.56
The effect of the J C. Penney decision has been interpreted
narrowly to restrict the time price exception in retail transactions
in Wisconsin. The fact the court would hand down such a far-
reaching decision suggests that perhaps something more was op-
erating than appears on the face of the opinion. Two elements of
the opinion suggest what may have been the undisclosed consider-
ation. First, there was nothing present in the Wisconsin common
law up to that point that would have forced the court ultimately
to such a decision; rather, in formulating its list of indicia, the
court drew heavily on Nebraska and Arkansas where like deci-
sions had evolved more gradually 57 Moreover, in attempting to
52. Id. at 147, 179 N.W.2d at 654.
53. Id. at 150, 179 N.W.2d at 654.
54. Id. at 151, 179 N.W.2d at 655.
55. Id. at 152, 179 N.W.2d at 655.
56. Id. at 153, 179 N.W.2d at 655.
57. See B. CURRAN, supra note 16, at 87. Arkansas has a constitu-
tional prohibition against usury and at the time of each of the following
decisions there was no special vendor-credit sales legislation in force in
Arkansas. Ford v. Hancock, 36 Ark. 248 (1880) held that it was a ques-
tion for the jury whether a particular contract was a bona fide credit sale
and not subject to usury or merely a device to conceal usury. Hare v.
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mold the opinion into a cohesive force, the court repeatedly urged
attention to substance rather than form.58 Herein lies the second
element, suggesting that the court is interested in a result which
comes closer to the original "spirit and intent" of the laws of usury
than one might come by merely fitting the agreement into a par-
ticular legal niche. The court appears to have taken note of the
fact that the forces of our credit economy have placed the con-
sumer in the position of the necessitous borrower with unequal
bargaining power, and has thus retreated to a moral interpreta-
tion of the usury statute to effect a measure of consumer protec-
tion.59
Such an interpretation is not without its justification in a
society which has, up to now, been primarily creditor oriented.
Yet the decision perhaps ignores the economic realities of con-
sumer credit.60 While it is difficult to determine what the actual
costs and revenues of a revolving charge account are in fact,
there is some evidence that even in large department stores re-
volving charge accounts may not be supporting their own costs.0 '
If this is indeed true, however, then there are three major effects
which the forcible lowering of the allowable rate might have.
First, it may induce merchants to shift the additional cost onto
the cash buyer, forcing the cash buyer in effect to subsidize the
General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952) held
that a conditional installment sales contract wich was transferred by
credit arrangement to a third party sales finance company fell within the
constitutional prohibition. A number of later cases reaffirmed this posi-
tion. Then, in Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W.2d
802 (1957), the court applied the usury law to a direct sale of goods on
credit.
In Nebraska, the court in Elder v. Doerr, 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W.2d
528 (1963) declared that charges in a retail installment sales contract for
a motor vehicle were interest and that the provisions of the act authoriz-
ing the charges were in violation of the Nebraska constitution which pro-
hibited special laws regulating the interest on money. After the Doerr
decision, the legislature reenacted essentially the same statute which the
court struck down again in Stanton v. Mattson, 175 Neb. 767, 123 N.W.2d
844 (1963). Also, in Lloyd v. Gutgsell, 175 Neb. 775, 124 N.W.2d 198
(1963), the court declared that when a time sale price is computed by ap-
plying a certain schedule of rates and charges to the cash price, the re-
sulting product is interest. Finally, in 1964, the legislature amended the
constitution to say that the legislature shall have authority to separately
define and classify loans and installment sales. NEB. CoNsT. art. I, § 18.
58. 48 Wis. 2d at 138, 142-43, 179 N.W.2d at 647, 650-51.
59. For a discussion of moral usury see F. RYAN, UsuRy AmD Usuny
LAws 10-17 (1924).
60. See Benfield, supra note 10, at 838. See also B. CuRnAr, supra
note 16, at 66.
61. See NATIONAL RETAIL MERcHANTS AssocIATION, supra note 23, at
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credit buyer.0 2 Second, it may cause merchants to reduce the
amount of credit which they offer, thereby barring the high-risk,
and possibly more necessitous consumer from the credit mar-
ket.0 3  Third, such a lowering of allowable rates could, at its
worst, drive smaller, more marginal retailers out of business.0 4
It is open to speculation whether any of these possibilities will,
in fact, occur in Wisconsin where the rate ceiling is moderately
high compared to other states. 5 But should they occur, they
will affect consumer and merchant alike.
In conclusion, usury laws have had a long and varied history,
often changing with the economic pressures of a particular period.
The widespread growth of consumer credit transactions has pro-
vided yet another economic setting in which to view these laws
and their effects on both borrower and lender. The revolving
charge account presents a unique form of credit transaction whose
ever increasing use suggests the need for a comprehensive ex-
amination of the treatment desired for such transactions in re-
lation to general usury laws. The possible economic impact of
nolding the revolving charge account subject to general usury
statutes only serves to emphasize the desirability of special legis-
lative consideration of alternative treatment of the type sug-
gested m a variety of retail instalment sales acts and in the Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code. The outcome of such a decision is
of too much importance to both merchants and consumers to be
overlooked by the legislature. 6
6
62. Id. at 30.
63. See Malcom, supra note 17.
64. See NATIONAL RETAIL MEn CNTs AssocxATioN, supra note 23,
at 30.
65. 1 CCH CoNsumR CRrr GUIDE 510 (1970) Only twelve states
have interest rates greater than Wisconsin's. They are: Colorado, Con-
necticut, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Utah and Washington.
66. At present, there are suits pending in about a dozen states to
adjudicate the issues presented by the instant case. The Wall Street
Journal, March 4, 1971, at 1, col. 6. Recently, a Minnesota district court
held a revolving charge account transaction similar to the one in J C.
Penney to be in violation of MINN. STAT. § 334.01 (1969), prohibiting the
taking of interest on the loan or forbearance of money in excess of eight
percent per annum. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. O'Neill, No. 373670
(Dist. Ct. Minn., Apr. 2, 1971), State v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No.
373678 (Dist. Ct. Minn., Apr. 2, 1971)
1254 [Vol. 55:1244
1255
Criminal Law: Unreasonable Visual Observation Held
to Violate Fourth Amendment
Testimony of observations during a continuous clandes-
tine surveillance of a public restroom led to appellant's convic-
tion.for consensual sodomy 1 The security supervisor of a large
department store had notice that a hole about 2-1/2 inches in
diameter had been cut m the partition separating two stalls in
the men's restroom. He and the store manager suspected illegal
homosexual activity With the aid of the St. Paul police they
devised a system whereby the toilet stalls could be observed
through a ventilator m the ceiling of the restroom. From this
vantage point the defendant was observed m the act of oral sod-
omy The sole issue appealed was the admissibility of the evi-
dence.2 With three justices dissenting, the Minnesota Supreme
Court reversed the lower court conviction and held the evidence
obtained by this secret surveillance was obtained m violation of
the constitutional rights of those using the restroom facilities
and was therefore inadmissible. State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205,
177 N.W 2d 800 (1970).
The right to be secure from governmental search and seizure
has been defined by the courts primarily through interpretation
of the fourth amendment.3 The interest protected is that of the
individual in maintaining a certain degree of privacy with regard
to his person and effects. 4 The fourth amendment was held bind-
ing upon the states by incorporation into the fourteenth amend-
ment,5 and is inplemented m the courts by the "exclusionary
rule" 6 made applicable to the states in the leading case of Mapp
1. Mnsri. STAT. § 609.293, subd. 5 (1969).
2. State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205, 206, 177 N.W.2d 800, 801 (1970).
3. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV It has been suggested that this interest
may enjoy overlapping protection from the provisions of the first and
fifth amendments as well. With respect to the first amendment, see
Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of
Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 968, 980 (1968), where
the possibility is discussed and ultimately rejected. As to the fifth
amendment, see Boyd'v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1866), which
recognized the fifth amendment implications of the forced disclosure of
incriminating evidence.
4. See the famous early English case, Entick v. Carrington, C.P
1765, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, indicative of how deeply rooted in Anglo-
Saxon common law are these interests now protected by the fourth
amendment.
5. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). See also Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968), Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
6. This rule provides simply that evidence obtained in an illegal
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v. Ohio.7 Constitutional provisions similar to the fourth amend-
ment have been widely enacted by the states,8 and prior to Mapp
many states had voluntarily adopted the exclusionary rule.0
Since the fourth amendment speaks in terms of the reason-
ableness of the search, all decisions in this area necessarily in-
volve a determination of the reasonableness of the challenged
search,10 in light of the particular facts and circumstances of the
case." The analysis generally has entailed a decision first,
whether the area in question was constitutionally protected; sec-
ond, whether a search had in fact taken place, and third, whether
that search was unreasonable.
Some fundamental changes have recently modified tradi-
tional rules pertaining to the first question-the nature of a con-
stitutionally protected area. Because the fourth amendment
spoke of houses, early cases confined the scope of the amend-
ment to places analogous to houses and enclosed spaces. Gradu-
ally this protection was extended to garages,'1 2 hotel rooms,18 of-
fices,'14 business establishments, 8 taxis' and desks.1 7 Until quite
recently, no case explored the possibility of an extension of this
protection to areas temporarily privately occupied but otherwise
of an entirely public nature.'8
search or seizure is thereafter inadmissible. This is the "right arm" of
the fourth amendment. After examining the alternatives, the Supreme
Court determined the exclusionary rule provided the only effective pro-
tection of fourth amendment rights. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
7. 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
8. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10; WIs. CONST. art. I, § 11, CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 19; N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 12.
9. E.g., California had adopted the rule on its own. People v.
Gahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955) Minnesota, however, had not,
holding such illegally obtained evidence to be admissible. State v. Si-
poren, 215 Minn. 438, 10 N.W.2d 353 (1943). See also State v. Richter,
270 Minn. 307, 133 N.W.2d 537 (1965), wherein Minnesota refused to apply
the Mapp rule retroactively
10. "The fundamental requirement of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness." State v. Romeo, 43 N.J. 188, 203, 203 A.2d 23, 32 (1964)
11. Ker v. Califorma, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), Go-Bart Importing Co.
v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) See also State v. Kinderman, 271
Minn. 405, 136 N.W.2d 577, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 909 (1965), State v.
Harris, 265 Minn. 260, 121 N.W.2d 327, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 867 (1963).
12. Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932).
13. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483 (1964).
14. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
15. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931)
16. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960)
17. United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
18. It is interesting to note that prior to Bielicki v. Superior Court,
57 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962), the author of Con-
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Traditionally, a search was defined solely in terms of physi-
cal intrusion into the protected area. Evidence obtained by the
senses, artificially magnified or not, without physical intrusion
did not fall within the prohibition of the fourth amendment.10
The advent of sophisticated electronic methods of surveillance
made apparent the inequities of the "physical intrusion" doctrine.
Supreme Court decisions on this point produced the Olmstead-
Goldman rule holding electronic eavesdropping not to be a
search within the meaning of the fourth amendment if there was
no trespass.20 The strength of this rule became gradually at-
tenuated in a number of cases which came to recognize that petty
techmcalities were controlling case outcomes, with no rational
basis for differences.2 1
The landmark decision of Katz v. United States22 completely
overhauled the test for determining the admissibility of evidence
obtained through such search and seizure.23 In holding iadmis-
sible evidence obtained in the electronic surveillance of a con-
versation in a public telephone booth, the Court explicitly over-
ruled Goldman and Olnstead.2 4 Mr. Justice Stewart, writing
ment, Clandestine Police Surveillance of Public Toilet Booth Held to be
Unreasonable Search, 63 COLuM. L. Rrv. 955, 957 (1963) lamented that no
such cases could be found.
19. Comment, supra note 18, at 957 & nn.28, 29 & 30.
20. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (neither fourth
nor fifth amendment held to bar admission of wire-tap evidence) (Bran-
deis, J. dissenting), Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (evi-
dence obtained from use of "detectaphone" placed against but not into a
wall held admissible).
21. In Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), evidence ob-
tained through the use of a "spike-mike" driven into the wall was held
madmissible. Clearly the logic becomes strained when the controlling
distinction is solely the difference between placing a microphone against
the wall or placing it into the wall. It became apparent that the exist-
ence of a violation of a constitutional right could not turn on the nu-
ances of local trespass law. Stoner v. United States, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
The concept that a conversation simply could not be the subject of a
search within the context of the fourth amendment finally gave way in
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), but that case declined to do away
explicitly with the Olmstead-Goldman rule. But cf. Mr. Justice Blacks
dissent in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364 (1967), demonstrating
that the narrow reading of the fourth amendment regarding conversa-
tions is not completely dead. "A conversation overheard by eavesdrop-
pings, whether plato snooping or wiretapping, is not tangible and, un-
der the normally accepted meanings of words, can neither be searched
nor seized." 389 U.S. at 365.
22. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
23. "In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court purported to clean
house on outmoded Fourth Amendment principles." Note, supra note 3,
at 975.
24. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
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for the majority, concluded, "The Fourth Amendment protects
people not places. '25 This oft-quoted statement expresses a com-
plete rejection of the outmoded, simplistic requirement that tres-
pass is an indispensable condition to the finding of an unreason-
able search. The principal contribution of Katz is its recognition
that the fourth amendment protects a positive right of personal
privacy from unwarranted governmental intrusion.20 Under the
new rule, the elements of an unreasonable search are the justi-
fiable reliance of the defendant upon his privacy and a search
violating that privacy 27 Katz has adopted the principle that
even public areas can temporarily become private for pur-
poses of the fourth amendment. 28
A distinct group of cases, principally from California, has
dealt with the specific problem of secret surveillance of public
restrooms for the purpose of discovering homosexual activity 20
The premise is that evidence of criminal homosexual activity is
admissible if the offense was directly observable by the public
in the normal usage of the facility 30 The user has no right to
expect privacy if, for example, there was no door on the stall.8i
The more difficult case has arisen where police set up a secret
25. Id. at 351.
26. The Katz court was careful, however, to stop short of declaring
that the fourth amendment created a general right of privacy 389 U.S.
at 350. That right is protected only with respect to unreasonable gov-
ernment intrusions within the prohibitions of the fourth amendment.
Note, supra note 3, at 981.
27. 389 U.S. at 353.
28. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public may be constitutionally protected." 389 U.S. at 351 (footnotes
omitted). "The point is not that the booth is 'accessible to the public' at
other times but that it is a temporarily private place whose mo-
mentary occupants' expectations of freedom from intrusion are recog-
nized as reasonable." Id. at 361. See also Rios v. United States, 364 U.S.
253 (1960) (Harlan, J. concurring).
Following the Katz decision, federal legislation was enacted em-
bodying these principles for the regulation of electronic eavesdropping.
See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 802, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(2) (Supp. IV 1969) Similar state statutes have been enacted.
See, e.g., MNN. STAT. ch. 626A (1969).
29. See, e.g., Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966), Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d
602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962), Britt v. Superior Court, 58
Cal. 2d 469, 374 P.2d 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1962)
30. Poore v. Ohio, 243 F Supp. 777 (N.D. Ohio 1965), People v
Young, 214 Cal. App. 2d 131, 29 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1963), People v Norton,
209 Cal. App. 2d 173, 25 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1962), State v. Coyle, 181 So. 2d
671 (Fla. App. 1966)
31. State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205, 177 N.W.2d 800 (1970)
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vantage point, as in the instant case, from which all activity in
the stalls can be observed. Three cases prior to Bryant have
dealt with this precise problem. Bielickz v. Superior Court3 2
and Britt v. -Superior Court3 both held that evidence obtained
in such a manner was inadmissible, anticipating Katz in their
rationale. Yet the ninth circuit in 1966 reached the opposite con-
clusion on virtually identical facts in Smayda v. Unted States.34
The degree to which the rationale of Bielickz and Britt antici-
pates Kat2, decided almost five years later, is extraordinary
Although somewhat less articulate, their premise is a basic ab-
horrence of this kind of invasion of privacy 35 Britt announced
a test virtually identical to that offered by Mr. Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Katz. 38 Each concluded that the ability to
observe secretly that which is public is clearly distinct from a li-
cense to invade the "protected right of personal privacy of per-
sons in private places. 3 7
These pre-Katz attempts to establish a fourth amendment
right to privacy were only partially successful.3 8 The Supreme
Court of the United States articulated the controlling principle
that the defendant should enjoy a right to a personal zone of pri-
vacy when he "justifiably relies" thereon.3 9 Justice Harlan in-
terpreted this rule as a two-fold requirement-i) that the defend-
ant exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy and 2) that society
be prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable. 40  This
test is a combination of objective and subjective criteria.4 1
32. 57 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962).
33. 58 Cal. 2d 469, 374 P.2d 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1962).
34. 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. dented, 382 U.S. 981 (1966).
35. Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 472, 374 P.2d 817, 819,
24 Cal. Rptr. 849, 851-(1962). "Apparently underlying the court's deci-
sion is a recognition that a broad gloss pervades the constitutional lan-
guage and that .the proscription against unreasonable searches is aimed
not exclusively oz principally at protecting property interests, but pri-
marily at -safeguarding the freedom of individuals from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into their privacy." Comment, Clandestine Po-
lice Surveillance, of Public Toilet Held to Be Unreasonable Search, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 955, 960 (1963).
36. See text accompanying note 40 ,nfra.
37. Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d at 472, 374 P.2d at 819, 24
Cal. Rptr. at 851.
38. See, e.g., discussion of Smayda v. United States at text accom-
panying note 47 %nfra.
39. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). For an effective
analysis of this rephrasing of the Katz test and its implications, see
Note, supra note 3, at 982.
40., 389 U.S. at 3.61.
41. The subjective features of this test are inherent in the Bryant
opinion. "We think that those using the facilities would have been
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State v. Bryant is the first post-Katz decision on this ques-
tion, the first non-California case with these particular facts and
a case of first impression in Minnesota. Chief Justice Knutson's
majority opinion adopted the Katz rationale regarding personal
zones of privacy, and expressly recognized Katz as controlling
the instant case. In addition, Bielickz and Britt are quoted at
length and held to be indistinguishable from the instant case.4 2
The Bryant court also deals perfunctorily with the issue of
"third party consent." A line of cases has held that in certain
circumstances a third party can consent to a search or invasion
of another's privacy 43 This position was properly rejected in
the instant case since the department store manager was not in
exclusive control of the area searched, the toilet stall itself,44
and was therefore incapable of validly consenting to a search.
The Bryant opinion has weaknesses. It cites Smayda v.
United States,45 a pre-Katz rejection of the Bielicki-Brtt ap-
proach, yet fails to distinguish that case explicitly The Snayda
decision has been described as "bizarre" 46 and "unsound" 47 due
to its disregard of the compelling logic of the two previous Cali-
fornia decisions. 48 The case has been consistently criticized and
quite shocked to know they were under surveillance." 287 Minn. at 211,
177 N.W.2d at 804. This evinces a concern with the subjective aware-
ness of the individual. As a practical matter, query- How does a de-
fendant exhibit an expectation of privacy
42. State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205, 177 N.W.2d 800, 801 (1970)
43. See generally Note, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure:
The Need for a New Evaluation, 41 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 82 (1966), Note,
Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 12 (1967),
Comment, 33 U. Cin. L. REV. 797 (1966)
44. Minnesota has adopted the rule that to consent validly the third
party must be in exclusive control of the area to be searched. State v.
Kinderman, 271 Minn. 405, 136 N.W.2d 577 (1965) California, on the
other hand, has adopted the "Gorg rule" which provides that if the offi-
cer reasonably relied on the apparent authority of the owner to search
the premises the search is lawful. People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 291 P.2d
469 (1955) Nevertheless, the application of this rule in the Bielilck case
was considered and rejected. 57 Cal. 2d at 607, 371 P.2d at 291, 21
Cal. Rptr. at 555 (1962)
45. 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966)
46. Note, supra note 3, at 974.
47. Comment, Fourth Amendment Application to Semi-Public
Areas: Smayda v. United States, 17 HAsT. L. Rv. 835, 842 (1966)
48. An interesting case that examnes both the Smayda opinion and
the Bielicki-Britt doctrine is State v. Coyle, 181 So. 2d 671 (Fla. App.
1966) It held the evidence admssible, however, following the line of




because of its anomalous result has generated more commentary
than it probably deserved. 49 The Bryant court does indicate
inferentially that Smayda has little value as precedent through
its principal reliance upon the subsequent Katz decision. The
court also cites Brown v. State,50 which employed the precise
language of Smayda, yet reached a diametrically opposite result.
Both Brown and Smayda recognized that "a modicum of pri-
vacy" is available to an individual in a toilet stall. Smayda
found that interest insufficient to counterbalance society's inter-
est m law enforcement, while Brown found it fully sufficient to
outweigh the police interest.51
Justice Sheran's dissent in Bryant urged a standard of pri-
vacy which would turn on whether the defendant's acts sub-
verted "the owner's intention."52  That is, toilet stalls are pri-
vate except when unlawful activities occur there. This is a
wholly circular argument. Such reasoning would allow authori-
ties to search any area of suspected criminal activity without fur-
ther justification than their suspicion. Apparently the dissent
sinply was not persuaded that toilet stalls should be considered
private areas immune from unreasonable searches.
A much more difficult problem is that raised by Justice Otis'
dissenting opinion. That opinion questioned what alternatives
are available to the department store and the police in the exer-
cise of their reasonable interest "to prevent legitimate cus-
tomers and their children from being exposed to defendant's re-
volting deviant behavior? ' 53 The prosecution of homosexual of-
fenses in these cases arises more in an effort to combat the nui-
sance to the customer generated by these acts than a desire to
eradicate the substantive criminal behavior. Even among those
who believe private consensual homosexual activity should not
be of concern to the criminal law, most will admit that elimina-
tion of the nuisance factor is a legitimate interest of those provid-
ing public restroom facilities.
Justice Knutson's majority opinion attempts to offer some
workable alternatives in answer to Justice Otis' objections in this
49. See Comment, supra note 47; Comment, Constitutional Law-
Clandestine Surveillance of Public Toilet-Not an Unreasonable Search,
19 VAND. L. Rsv. 945 (1966), Comment, Police Surveillance of Public
Toilets, 23 WAsiL & LEE L. REv. 423 (1966).
50. 3 Md. App. 90, 238 A.2d 147 (1968).
51. Compare zd. at 94, 238 A2d at 149 with Smayda v. United States,
352 F.2d 251, 257 (9th Cir. 1965).
52. 287 Minn. at 212, 177 N.W.2d at 804.
53. Id. at 213, 177 N.W.2d at 805.
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regard, such as sealing the hole between the stalls, removing the
doors or posting signs warning of police surveillance.5 4 The first
would probably discourage homosexual activity only tempo-
rarily The latter two suggestions seem to be wholly inconsistent
with the store's goal of providing secluded, respectable restroom
facilities to its customers. The average customer would hardly
prefer a doorless stall, and surely would be deterred from enter-
ing a restroom outside which warning signs advised of the possi-
bility of frequent overhead surveillance.
One possible solution would be to attempt to legitimize such
surveillance through the use of a warrant procedure. Justice
Otis' remark that "it would never be possible to secure a
search warrant in situations of this kind"", may be an over-
statement. Given an egregious fact situation, it is at least argu-
able that a warrant should issue. Undoubtedly Justice Otis is
referring to the virtual impossibility that any such surveillance
warrant could meet the constitutional requirements of specific-
ity and probable cause.56 At present, electrical surveillance
warrant procedures have been established by the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 196857 and by similar state stat-
utes.58 The analogy of wiretaps to visual observation, however,
is problematic. If a warrant for such surveillance were to issue,
its basis would be a rough analogy to such statutory authoriza-
tion, yet real doubts exist as to the constitutional sufficiency of
the specificity requirements of the Safe Streets Act itself.59
There are, moreover, factual distinctions between this kind of
visual observation and wiretapping. The major and perhaps de-
54. Id. at 211, 177 N.W.2d at 804.
55. Id. at 213, 177 N.W.2d at 805 (emphasis added)
56. Federal warrants are governed by F. R. Canv. P Rule 41 imple-
menting the fourth amendment; Minnesota has parallel provisions,
MuN. STAT. §§ 626.01-.04 (1969).
57. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (Supp. IV, 1968)
58. E.g., MziN. STAT. §§ 626A.06-.25 (1969) (Privacy of Communica-
tions Act)
59. See Linzer, Federal Procedure for Court Ordered Electronic
Surveillance: Does it Meet the Standards of Berger and Katz?, 60 J.
CriM. L.C.&P.S. 203 (1969), concluding that the specificity requirements
of 18 U.S.C. § 2518 may be too liberal in light of the policies of Berger and
Katz, depending perhaps on the responsibility exercised in the adminis-
tration of this warrant procedure. "Police abuse of the provisions of
Section 2518 could lead the Court to establish more rigid and severe
requirements for eavesdropping, a development that could spell the end
of electronic surveillance as an effective law enforcement tool." Id. at
214. See also Mascolo, Specificity Requirements for Warrants under the
Fourth Amendment: Defining the Zone of Privacy, 73 DicK. L. REV. 1
(1968), wherein it is felt that there will be inevitable abuse under the
1262 [Vol. 55:1255
CASE COMMENTS
terminative difference'is that a much larger number of innocent
parties are likely to have their privacy invaded. A phone tap
focuses the thrust of the investigation on the prine suspect, and
while every such search involves some probing of the conversa-
tion of third parties, their number is small and the intrinsic of-
fensiveness of the intrusion is relatively slight in comparison to
that of the Bryant-style surveillance. Nevertheless, in a case
where the nuisance factor is particularly involved, thereby satis-
fying the probable cause requirement, it is at least arguable that
a surveillance warrant should issue, providing it is drafted to
conform to strictly regulated procedures and is limited in length
of permissible observation. At this time such a procedure lies
at the outer edge of the limits of constitutionality, yet it is per-
haps the only effective control of nuisance homosexuality
The Bryant court arrived at the correct conclusion for the
correct reasons, but avoided the opportunity, if not the responsi-
bility, to define a more workable rule for delineating a protected
zone of privacy The court seems carefully to avoid specifying
any test or standard beyond the skeletal and ambiguous criteria
specified in Katz to determine whether a person has or should
have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" Although the cor-
relative question of the reasonableness of a search is a factual
one dependent upon the particular circumstances of each case,
certain identifiable factors can be considered in each such fact
situation in an effort to narrow the inquiry into reasonableness.
For example, determination as to whether the area in ques-
tion is or is not constitutionally protected is necessary It is a
mistake to view Katz as eliminating the latter possibility30-all
Katz dispensed with was slavish adherence to the technicalities
of state trespass law.61 Structural characteristics therefore are
not irrelevant and the opinion in the instant case devotes full at-
tention to the dimensions of the stalls in its recitation of facts.
Just as the Harlan test emphasizes, -02 it is not enough that the de-
Safe Streets Act, yet at present it seems the Supreme Court is willing to
"pay this price for the continued use of a claimed effective law enforce-
ment tool. . " Id. at 38.
60. "As the CourVs opinion states, 'the Fourth Amendment protects
people not places.' The question, however, is what protection it af-
fords to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question
requires reference to a 'place." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967) (Harlan, J. concurring).
61. This distinction is well drawn in Note From Private Places to
Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection,
43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 968, 983 (1968).




fendant rely on his privacy on the basis of a "high probability of
freedom from intrusion," 63 but society also must be willing to
recognize that expectation of privacy as reasonable. In the latter
condition is hidden the true test. There must be a balancing to
determine whether society is prepared to acknowledge a right of
privacy in certain circumstances, thereby sacrificing some of its
control over the criminal activities that thereby may escape de-
tection. 4
Another factor that necessarily influences this equation is
the nature of the police conduct. If the manner of police surveil-
lance is shocking, the likelihood of the evidence so obtained be-
mg admitted is diminished. Thus, if police use artificial means
of observation to view that which is not normally visible to the
public, the intrusion ordinarily will be found unreasonable. 5
The severity of the crime is also a factor to be considered. 0 In
this regard much can be said for the proposition that consensual
homosexuality does not present a threat to an ordered society
sufficient to justify the extreme measures of warrantless
search.7 It is not wholly irresponsible to suggest that such con-
duct simply be ignored when the offense is actually accom-
plished in a private area. Acts that could be observed by the
public could be detected lawfully by police through visual ob-
servation from a non-artificial vantage point. This argument
assumes the objectionable conduct will not in any way annoy
or interfere with third parties. For nuisance homosexuality the
63. Note, supra note 61, at 983.
64. "In general, it may be said that a search is considered 'unreason-
able' when the interests of society in suppressing crime and maintaining
the community's health are deemed outweighed by the interests of the
individual in his property and privacy." Comment, supra note 35, at 957,
958 (citations omitted)
65. See, e.g., People v. Berutko, 71 Cal. 2d 84, 453 P.2d 721, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 217 (1969), where the court reviewed the relevant cases and dis-
tinguished between three different degrees of reasonableness in police
conduct: 1) a vantage point gained by trespass but natural observation;
2) a vantage point gained without trespass but artificial observation
(spy holes, etc.), and 3) non-trespassory non-artificial observation-ac-
tivities visible due to defendant's own carelessness. The first two are
generally found unreasonable; the latter is permitted. The fourth
amendment will not draw the defendant's blinds.
66. "The seriousness of the crimnal conduct may affect the degree
to which people will tolerate intrusive detection techniques." F REM-
INGTON, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 73 (1969)
67. Much has been written proposing a total end to governmental
concern over private consensual sexual relations between adults. See,
e.g., Note, The Bedroom Should Not Be within the Promnce of the Law, 4
CALIF. WEST L. REv. 115 (1968), Note, Prvate Consensual Homosexual
Behavior The Crime and its Enforcement, 70 YALE L.J. 623 (1961)
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use of the surveillance warrant is arguably the only effective
preventive measure.68 Ultimately the question is the extent to
which society is prepared to recognize a right of privacy in par-
ticular public areas. That there is a vague and indistinct consti-
tutional right of privacy has been established. 6A Yet more specif-
ically, within the fourth amendment, there is a right of privacy
only to the extent that the Katz test protects a defendant. Cer-
tainly the nature of the area in question in the instant case is one
which ordinarily commands a great deal of privacy in our so-
ciety 70 Its inclusion in the protected zone of privacy would
seem to be a fortior after the telephone booth in Katz. The
test suggested m Justice Sheran's dissent that the zone of privacy
should be protected only when put to the intended use ignores
the existence of any such positive right of privacy as announced
m Katz.
These factors may not be wholly determinative. Yet the
Bryant court made no attempt to express the precise bases of its
decision. Here was an opportunity to set out in detail the post-
Katz standards more clearly to aid in future litigation on this
particular question. Traditionally it has been the function of the
appellate court to formulate more useful tests to aid in the appli-
cation and adminimstration of the broad policies and rules of law
established by the United States Supreme Court. The Bryant
court reaches a laudable decision and the case indubitably will
prove to be an influential decision, but for that very reason it is
unfortunate that a more detailed elaboration of the appropriate
factors, standards and alternatives was not provided.
68. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
69. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). There is also re-
dress for tortious intrusions on privacy; see Prosser, Prvacy, 48 CAuF.
L. REv. 383 (1960), Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAIV.
L. REV. 193 (1890). See also Note, supra note 61, at 979, 980 for an excel-
lent, brief treatment of the various categories within the concept of pri-
vacy, emphasizing the limited right of privacy defined by post-Katz
fourth amendment doctrine. For a forceful appeal for further safeguards
on the right of privacy in this specific context, see Osborn v. United
States, 385 U.S. 323, 340 (1966) (separate opinion of Douglas, J.).
70. Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE I.J. 475, 482 (1968), where the author
considers the social and psychological values placed on certain activities
m our culture. We demand extreme privacy surrounding the excretory




Torts: Burden of Proof-Concurrent Tortfeasors Given
Burden of Apportioning Damages
Although much has been written concerning the imposi-
tion of joint and several liability' in multiple tortfeasor situa-
tions,2 the equitable and public policy considerations implicit in
the decision to hold each defendant liable for the total damage
has new relevance today The areas of highway chain collisions
and of environmental and property damage caused by multiple
industrial and commercial polluters provide a setting of growing
public concern for the application of joint and several liability
concepts.
The substantive development of joint and several liability
has been slow because of a failure to separate the procedural as-
pects of joining defendants in multiple tortfeasor situations from
the substantive consideration of where the responsibility for dam-
age should be placed. The failure of early courts to recognize
this distinction is due in part to the strict common law rules of
joinder of parties. In the earliest cases where such joinder was
permitted the English courts required concert of action, charac-
terized by a common purpose and mutual aid in carrying out the
act.3 Given the concert of action, the plaintiff was viewed as
having but one cause of action and the jury was not allowed to
apportion the damages. 4 Where no concert of action was shown,
1. Joint and several liability will hereinafter mean that each tort-
feasor is liable for the total amount of the damage suffered by plaintiff.
2. See generally Wigmore, Joint Tortfeasors and Severance of
Damages: Making the Innocent Party Suffer Without Redress, 17 MIcH.
L. REv. 458 (1923), Gendel, Concurrent But Independent Wrongdoers:
Joint Liability for Entire Damages, 19 CALIF. L. Rnv. 630 (1931), Prosser,
Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 413 (1937), Comment,
Independent Tortfeasors-Joint and Several Liability, 31 N.C. L. REV.
237 (1953), Comment, Automobiles-Separate Acts of Negligence Caus-
ing Separate Injuries--Jomt and Several Liability, 14 ALA. L. Rv. 120
(1961), Comment, Contributory Negligence as a Matter of Law, 41 N.C. L.
REv. 512, 514-18 (1963), Note, Successive Automobile Collisions-Jotnt
and Several Liability, 44 N.C. L. REv. 249 (1965), Comment, Allocation of
Loss Among Joint Tortfeasors, 41 S. CAL. L. RIv. 728 (1968), Comment,
Joinder of Consecutive Tortfeasors, 52 MARQ. L. REV. 568 (1969)
3. In Sir John Heydon's case, 77 E.R. 1150 (K.B. 1613), the English
court found each of three defendants guilty jointly for the entire damage
caused by an assault on the plaintiff. The court reasoned that since the
defendants came together to do an unlawful act, the act of any one of
them was attributable to them all. See also Smithson v. Garth, 83 E.R.
711 (K.B. 1691), where defendants were held jointly liable for plaintiff's
injuries although one beat him, another imprisoned him and a third stole
his silver buttons.
4. See Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV.
413, 414 (1937) and early English cases cited therein.
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this narrow interpretation of joint and several liability meant that
to recover fully a plaintiff had to bring separate suits and prove
the damages attributable to each defendant. Even where the de-
fendants committed identical acts resulting m a single injury,
unless concert of action was shown the courts refused to allow
jomder.5
The liberalization of pleading introduced by the adoption of
the Field Code in New York in 1848, and similar codes in other
states, produced some relaxation of the rigid prmciples of join-
der in cases involving multiple tortfeasors.0 As the procedural
problems diminished and plaintiffs had greater flexibility in joi-
mg defendants, the substantive considerations of jomt and sev-
eral liability came into sharper focus.
The inequity of leaving an innocent plaintiff without recov-
ery because of his inability to establish which of two equally
culpable defendants caused his injury produced the first move-
ment toward extending joint and several liability to additional
multiple tortfeasor situations. To encompass the many factual
contexts in which such equitable considerations arise, various
tests of "jointness" have been devised: the existence of the same
cause of action against two or more defendants;7 the existence of
a common duty;. whether the same evidence will support an ac-
tion against each;9 the single indivisible nature of the injury to
the plaintiff;10 similarity of the facts as to time, place and re-
sult;i whether the injury is direct and immediate rather than
consequential.' 2
One of the most troublesome situations has been that in
which the independent but concurrent actions of the defendants
have combined to injure the plaintiff.13 Factually, the cases
5. See Chamberlain v. White and Goodwin, 79 E.IR 558 (KB. 1617),
where two persons who had uttered the same slanderous words could
not be joined; Nicoll v. Glenme, 105 E.R. 220 (LB. 1817), where succes-
sive converters could not be joined.
6. See C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING §§ 6-8 (2d ed. 1947) for a general
discussion of the pleading reform in England and the United State&
7. J. CLERK & W. IaNDsELT, ToRTs 112 (13th ed. 1969).
8. J. COoLEy, TORTs § 86, at 277 (4th ed. 1932).
9. Brunsden v. Humphrey (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 141, 147.
10. Flaherty v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co., 39 Minn. 328, 40
N.W. 160 (1888).
11. Petcoff v. St Paul City Ry. Co., 124 Minn. 531, 144 N.W 44
(1913).
12. Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke Co., 85 W. Va. 595, 102 S.E. 265
(1920).
13. Concurrently need not mean simultaneously. See Maddux v.
Donaldson, 362 Mlich. 425, 434, 108 N.W.2d 33, 38 (1960) where the court
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dealing with this situation can be divided into two categories.
The first is where the act of each independent tortfeasor is con-
ceptually sufficient to produce the total harm. Thus, in an early
Massachusetts case, the court found joint and several liability
where the plaintiff's horses were frightened by the noise of two
motorized cycles passing simultaneously on both sides of his
wagon. 1 4 In such cases neither wrongdoer has cause to complain
in being charged with the whole damage since his liability would
have been the same even if the other defendant had not been in-
volved. A similar example is found in a more recent case where
defendants fired simultaneous shot gun blasts in the direction of
the plaintiff and a single pellet struck plaintiff in the eye causing
injury The California Supreme Court found the defendants
jointly and severally liable.1 5
A second, and more complex, situation is presented where the
acts of independent tortfeasors result in a single indivisible in-
jury, but no one act is sufficient to produce the resultant harm.
For example, where one defendant maintained a rotten pole and
the other negligently felled a tree into it, the defendants were
held jointly and severally liable though neither defendant's act
standing alone would have caused the damage.' 0 Similarly,
where one defendant furnished an unseaworthy barge and the
other negligently loaded it, the defendants were held jointly and
severally liable for the resultant loss." Today, this situation is
stated:
It is pointed out, also, that one impact took place some 30
seconds after the other. The fact that one wrong, takes place a
few seconds after the other is without legal significance. What
is significant is that the injury is indivisible. The reason
for the rule as to joint liability for damages was the indivisi-
bility of the injuries, not the timing of the various blows.
The conclusion seems inescapable unless we take the position
that "concurrent" actually means "simultaneous," a position for
which there is no well-reasoned authority.
See also G. WiLLIAmS, JOINT TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 2
(1951), where it is stated with reference to concurrent tortfeasors:
"'Concurrence' has no reference to time, except that both torts must
precede the damage."
14. Corey v. Havener, 182 Mass. 250, 65 N.E. 69 (1902), See also
Oulighan v. Butler, 189 Mass. 287, 75 N.E. 726 (1905) (separate explosions,
either capable of causing the death of the plaintiffs decedent)
15. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) This situa-
tion is distinguishable since only a single pellet struck the victim; thus
one of the two defendants is being held for damage to which he did not
contribute at all. See also Anderson v. Minneapolis, St.P & S.S.M. RR.,
146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W 45 (1920) where defendant's fire combined with
the fire of no responsibile origin and the Minnesota court held the de-
fendant railroad accountable for the total damage.
16. Pacific T. & T. Co. v. Parmenter, 170 F 140 (9th Cir. 1909)
17. Strauhal v. Asiatic S.S. Co., 48 Ore. 100, 85 Pac. 230 (1906)
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typified by the modem highway chain collision which results
in unapportionable damage to one or more persons or automo-
biles."' In these cases, while the occurrence of separate acts pro-
vides a theoretical basis for apportioning the damages, in prac-
tice a reasonable division of the damages is frequently impos-
sible.19 The question is then to determine on whom the burden
of showing indivisibility should fall. Once it has been estab-
lished that the defendants' concurrent actions caused the injury,
should the plaintiff be compelled to demonstrate not only the in-
jury itself but also the unapportionability of that injury, or
should the defendants be required to prove divisibility of the
damages to escape the imposition of joint and several liability?
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently addressed itself to
these questions in Mathews v. Mills.2 0 Plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs.
Mathews, were injured when their car was involved in two suc-
cessive but nearly simultaneous collisions. A single action was
commenced against the drivers of the other two cars. In a spe-
cial verdict the jury found each defendant guilty of causing his
respective collision with the plaintiffs. Damages were not ap-
portioned between the defendants and each defendant was
awarded 50 percent contribution from the other. On appeal by
one defendant, the Minnesota Supreme Court specifically adopted
the single indivisible injury rule, that is, where plaintiff suffers
injuries, incapable of any reasonable division, as a result of con-
current accidents caused by independent tortfeasors, each tort-
feasor is liable for the full amount of damage sustamed.2' How-
ever, the Minnesota court clarified the single indivisible injury
18. See cases collected at 100 A.L.R.2d 17; see generally W. PnossEM,
LAW oF TORTS § 42 (3d ed. 1964), 38 Am. Jun. Negligence § 257 (1941).
19. Of course, where a reasonable basis for apportionment exists,
the courts quite uniformly hold that each wrongdoer is only responsible
for his portion of the damages. See Glen v. Chenowith, 71 Arm. 271,
226 P.2d 165 (1951), Garret v. Garret, 228 N.C. 530, 46 S.E.2d 302 (1948),
Rice v. McAdams, 149 N.C. 29, 62 S.E. 774 (1908), Swam v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 111 Tenn. 430, 78 S.W. 93 (1905). See generally W Pnossin,
LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 248 (3d ed. 1964), Annot, 100 A.L.P 2d 17.
20. - Minn. -, 178 N.W.2d 841 (1970).
21. In so holding, the court explicitly adopted the reasoning of the
Iowa Supreme Court in Rudd v. Grimm, 252 Iowa 1266, 110 N.W.2d
321 (1961). In that decision, the Iowa court had characterized the single
indivisible injury rule as:
[W]here two or more persons acting independently are guilty of
consecutive acts of negligence closely related m point of time,
and cause damage to another under circumstances where the
damage is indivisible, Le., it is not reasonably possible to make a
division of damage caused by the separate acts of negligence,
the negligent actors are jointly and severally liable.
Id. at 1272, 110 N.W.2d at 324.
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rule by answering the intermediate question of who has the
burden of proving the apportionability of the damages. The court
placed the burden squarely on the defendants.22
Earlier Minnesota cases had failed to reach the question of
who should bear the burden of apportioning the damages, al-
though they recognized that defendants could be held jointly and
severally liable when their independent acts combined to cause
a single injury to the plaintiff.23 Thus, as the court in Mathews
noted, in the abstract its conclusion added nothing to the exist-
ing law of the state with regard to the joint and several liability
of concurrent tortfeasors. 24  However, the Mathews court rec-
ognized that the single indivisible injury rule becomes viable
only when the burden of proof as to the capability of apportion-
ment of damages is assigned. In holding that the defendants
bear the burden of showing that the apportionment of damages is
possible, the court followed the Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 433 B (2) which states:
Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has been com-
bined to bring about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of
the actors seeks to limit his liability on the ground that the
harm is capable of apportionment among them, the burden of
proof as to the apportionment is upon each such actor.26
The Mathews court was strongly affected in reaching its con-
clusion on apportionment by the reasoning in two cases from
other jurisdictions. 2 6 In Maddux v. Donaldson27 the Michigan
Supreme Court considered the problem of damages when the
22. In Rudd v. Grimm, the Iowa court had concluded its statement
of the single indivisible injury rule by stating that "[T]he damage is
indivisible when the triers of fact decide that they cannot make a divi-
sion or apportionment thereof among the negligent actors." 252 Iowa at
1272, 110 N.W.2d at 324. Thus, the court failed to make clear who would
bear the burden of showing that the damages were capable of appor-
tionment.
23. See Judd v. Landin, 211 Minn. 465, 1 N.W.2d 861 (1942),
Twitchell v. Glenwood-Inglewood Co., 131 Minn. 375, 155 N.W 621
(1915), Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 123 Minn. 17, 142 N.W 930
(1913) See also Kruchowski v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 191 Minn. 454, 254
N.W 587 (1934)
24. - Minn. at -, 178 N.W.2d at 844. The court's citation to Doyle
v St. Paul Union Depot Co., 134 Minn. 461, 159 N.W 1081 (1916) is con-
fusing since the holding there was confined to the propriety of joinder of
concurrent tortfeasors in a single action. However, the Doyle court did
conclude in dictum that joint and several liability for concurrent tort-
feasors is the settled law of the state. See cases cited in note 23 supra.
See also DeCock v. O'Connell, 188 Minn. 228, 246 N.W 885 (1933)
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 B (1965).
26. - Minn. at -, 178 N.W.2d at 845.
27. 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33 (1960)
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car in which the plaintiffs were riding was struck first by one
automobile and then, almost simultaneously, by another. The
court noted that, however defensible it may have been in an
agrarian society to place the burden of apportioning damages
upon the plaintiffs, it has no place as precedent governing the lia-
bility of automobile owners in chain collisions on today's lugh-
ways. In Copley v. Putter28 the Califorma court was faced
with similar facts. There, after the first defendant's car had
moved into the plaintiff's lane of travel and collided with the
plaintiff, the second defendant collided with plaintiff's car from
the rear. The court held that each negligent defendant must
absolve himself by proving his own innocence or limited liability,
believing that to prevent a plaintiff from recovering because he
could not show which of two negligent tortfeasors had caused his
injury would be to obstruct justice.
The Minnesota court stated that placing the burden of proof
on the defendants to apportion the damages between them is the
result of a choice made as to where the loss due to a failure of
proof should fall-on an innocent plaintiff or on defendants who
are clearly proved to have been at fault. If it placed the burden
of apportioning the damages on the plaintiff, the court felt it
would be expressing a policy that it is better that a plaintiff in-
jured through no fault of is own take nothing than that a
wrongdoer pay more than his theoretical share of the damages. 2-
In the opinion of the justices, "[T]his placement of the burden of
proof is justified by considerations of fairness.130
Having fixed the burden of apportioning the damages on the
defendants, the court went on to state that it is a question of law
for the trial court to determine if the damages are capable of ap-
28. 93 Cal. App. 2d 453, 207 P.2d 876 (1949), see also Cummings v.
Kendall, 41 Cal. App. 2d 549, 107 P.2d 282 (1940).
29. - Minn. at -, 178 N.W.2d at 845. The reasoning of the court is
based on the proposition that it must relieve the plaintiff of the entire
burden of proof (beyond a prima facie showing of negligence and result-
ing damage) to avoid the inequity of requirmg a plaintiff to apportion
damages or take nothing. An intermediate position could have been
adopted regarding the burden of proof by giving the plaintiff the burden
of invoking the rule by showing an "indivisible injury" and then shifting
the burden of proof to the defendants to apportion the damage between
them. While the court's failure to articulate this alternative formula-
tion represents a "jump" in the logical development of its reasoning, the
alternative has little practical merit. Proof introduced by a plaintiff to
show an "indivisible injury" would not likely go beyond a showing of
the nature and extent of his injuries, a showing which he must already




portionment between the defendants. In reaching this conclu-
sion the court relied on the California court's decision in Apo-
cada v. Haworth.31 In that case the court recognized that ab-
sent any evidence to support limiting either defendant's liabil-
ity, any apportionment made by the jury would be a result of un-
substantiated speculation and would amount to little more than
judicially sanctioned guesswork. 32
The decision in Mathews has clarified Minnesota law as to
the joint and several liability of concurrent tortfeasors in the
highway chain collision situation. However, the court did fail to
define clearly the scope of the rule announced in other multiple
tortfeasor situations. While the cases relied upon by the court in
reaching its decision were confined to highway accident situa-
tions similar to that in the instant case, the broad equitable prin-
ciples announced as the rationale for the decision would have ap-
plication in a wider range of multiple tortfeasor situations. Fur-
ther, the specific reliance placed on section 433 B of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, which clearly emphasizes a wide range
of multiple tortfeasor situations, indicates that the court was
aware of the potential sweep of the rule announced.
The primary difficulty with a general extension of the rule is
that as the number of potential defendants contributing to the
damage increases, the plaintiff's inability to define the scope of
damages attributable to each defendant becomes a greater ob-
stacle to his recovery 33 On the other hand, the equities are not
as clearly in favor of the plaintiff where each defendant has con-
tributed only fractionally, though demonstrably, to the total dam-
age. In fact, when faced with the problem of many defendants
concurrently contributing to the damage suffered by the plain-
tiff, the courts have used various techniques to distinguish the
situation and thereby to avoid imposing joint and several liabil-
ity 3 4
31. 206 Cal. App. 2d 209, 23 Cal. Rptr. 461 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962)
32. This is also the position adopted by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 434(1) (b) (1965)
§ 434(1) It is the function of the court to determine
(b) Whether the harm to the plaintiff is capable of appor-
tionment among two or more causes.
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B Comments d and
e (1965). In Comment e it is noted that thus far the cases that have ap-
plied the rule have involved two or three tortfeasors. The possibility
exists that there may be so large a number of actors, each of whom con-
tribute a small and insignificant part to the total harm, that the rule
would work a disproportionate hardship on defendants. This problem
has not arisen, possibly because in such cases some evidence limiting lia-
bility has always been available.
34. See, e.g., Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke Co., 85 W Va. 595,
1272 [Vol. 55:1266
CASE COMMENTS
An increasingly significant situation in which this problem
will have to be faced in the future is the instance of multiple pol-
luters. Where each polluter has contributed only a fraction of
the total pollution causing the damage, an extension of the single
indivisible injury rule would seem to work a disproportionate
hardship on the defendants.3 5 Apparently recognizing this con-
sideration, the Minnesota Supreme Court has been reluctant to
find joint liability at law for damages caused by multiple pol-
luters.36 Nevertheless, where an individual industrial or com-
mercial source can be identified as a substantial pollution con-
tributor, and where the damage incurred can be sufficiently re-
lated to the pollutant source, the hardship of joint and several
102 S.E. 265 (1920), where the West Virginia court refused to impose joint
and several liability on concurrent polluters of a stream, stating that
where the resultant injury is the consequential rather than direct and
immediate result of the tortfeasors' action, joint liability will not be im-
posed. The problem in such a case is to articulate a realistic distinction
between "direct" and "consequential." Further, when a party could fore-
see the possibility of damage resulting from the merging of several tor-
tious acts, why not hold him jointly and severally liable? See note 36
rnfra, citing a case wherein the Mliinesota court distinguished imposingjoint and several liability in nuisance cases from that in negligence ac-
tions, stating that a nuisance does not rest on the degree of care exer-
cised by the defendant. However, it hardly follows that this distinction
in culpability should preclude plaintiff from recovering damages proxi-
mately caused by a defendant.
35. The weight of authority holds that where the acts of independ-
ent polluters combine to cause harm, the individual contributors cannot
be held jointly and severally liable. Slater v. Pacific Am. Oil Co. 63 CaL
App. 660, 292 P 651 (1930), reversed in part, 81 Cal. 858, 300 P 31 (1931),
Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke Co. 85 W Va. 595, 102 S.E. 265 (1920),
Miller v. Highland Ditch Co. 87 Cal. 430, 25 P 550 (1891). See also Doo-
ley v. 17,500 Head of Sheep, 4 Cal. 479, 35 P 1011 (1894), holding that ajoint action will not lie against the several owners of trespassing am-
mals. See generally 9 A.L.R. 939 (1920), supplemented at 35 A.L.R. 409
(1925) and 91 A.L.R. 759 (1934)
36. Johnson v. City of Fairmont, 188 Minn. 451, 247 N.W 572 (1933).
Sewage dumped by the City of Fairmont into a stream that flowed
through the plaintiffs farm and waste from a canning factory that over-
flowed into the same stream mingled to create offensive odors that con-
stituted a nuisance on plaintiffs farm. The court refused to sustain thejoint and several liability of the defendants. It distinguished the nui-
sance situation from that involved in negligence actions, stating that a
nuisance does not rest on the degree of care exercised by defendants.
The court noted that the torts were separate and individual and did not
become joint because their consequences mingled to cause damage to the
plaintiffs farm. But see Shuster v. City of Chisholn, 203 Minn. 518, 282
N.W. 135 (1938), Huber v. City of Blue Earth, 213 Minn. 319, 6 N.W.2d
471 (1942). In both cases the court sustained a verdict against the city on
the basis of its pollution of a stream running through plaintiffs land,
even though there was evidence that other concurrent polluters had con-
tributed to the damage suffered by the plaintiff.
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liability could more justifiably be imposed. In such a case the
equitable considerations relied on by the Mathews court would
suggest placing the burden of proof on the defendant polluter to
limit his own liability or, in the alternative, hold him liable for
the total damage.
In light of the confusion and the present flux of the law in
the area of pollution, the court's reluctance to announce a broad
general rule of tort liability applicable to all indivisible injury
situations is understandable. The extension of joint and several
liability to other multiple tortfeasor situations is primarily a
question of developing social policies to overcome traditional
barriers that prohibit imposing liability on a defendant for more
damage than he actually caused. As such, the parameters of the
single indivisible injury rule adopted by the Mathews court are
better reached through the probing and stretching process of sub-
sequent litigation which can mold the contours of the rule to ac-
commodate variations in economic and social factors that would
make a wholesale extension of joint and several liability imprac-
tical.31 It seems most likely that extension of the single indivi-
sible injury rule beyond the automobile chain collision setting
will come in cases where the plaintiff can readily identify a def-
inite group of defendants, each of whom is responsible as a sub-
stantial contributor to the damage suffered.
37. The presence of automobile liability insurance, which per-
mits distribution of the loss over all automobile drivers, mitigates any
inequity caused by requiring a defendant to pay more than his share
of the damage caused in an automobile accident. This broad-based in-
surance coverage against tort liability is generally lacking in other areas,
such as liability for pollution damage, to which the single indivisible in-jury rule could be extended, and this may be a pertinent factor in con-
sidering such extensions.
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